With insecurity escalating across Africa, from Jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel to maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), governments are turning to private military and security companies (PMSCs). From the infamous Wagner Group in Mali to smaller firms in Mozambique, Nigeria and even Kenya, these groups operate in secrecy and many times with limited public oversight.
PMSCs are changing Africa’s conflict landscape. Their impact is far-reaching and includes weakening democratic accountability, deepening foreign influence, and even reshaping economic priorities. Lines between private security and intelligence are blurring and raising new questions about sovereignty and the control of force on the continent.
Private military is not something new in Africa. In the 1990s, Executive Outcomes, a South African firm, intervened in Angola and Sierra Leone. They secured diamond-rich areas in exchange for battlefield success. Even though heavily criticises, they laid the groundwork for today’s contractors.
Fast forward to 2021, the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company began operating in Mali, allegedly in exchange for access to gold and other resources. Its presence echoes earlier patterns: foreign contractors with profit-driven motives entering fragile states to prop up regimes and protect lucrative assets.
Following its break with France, Mali’s junta brought in Wagner operatives to fight jihadist groups. But the fallout has been severe. In March 2022, a joint operation by Malian forces and Wagner fighters in Moura killed at least 500 civilians, according to a UN human rights investigation.
Witnesses described executions and mass graves. Wagner’s reported compensation? Rights to local gold mining operations.
In Sudan, Wagner operatives started arriving in 2017. They worked through a front company called Meroe Gold. The goal was to secure access to gold deposits. In return, Wagner reportedly provided weapons, training, and political support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)-a key player in Sudan’s current civil conflict. This trade-off-security for gold-has deepened Sudan’s instability. A 2024 TIME investigation found that smuggled “blood gold” was helping finance armed groups through Dubai’s gold markets, bypassing sanctions and sustaining conflict.
On the other hand, Mozambique’s government turned to Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) to help combat Islamist insurgents in Cabo Delgado province. DAG, a private South African outfit launched aerial assaults with minimal oversight. The results were mixed: insurgents were pushed back in some areas, but civilian casualties and allegations of misconduct emerged. A 2021 Amnesty International report documented unlawful killings and failed coordination with local forces. Mozambique’s use of DAG ended abruptly in 2021, but not before exposing the dangers of outsourcing war to unaccountable actors.
In Nigeria, local oil companies and state actors hired foreign and domestic private contractors to protect energy infrastructure in the Niger Delta. These firms sometimes operate outside formal military coordination, contributing to tensions between communities and the state.
Meanwhile in Kenya, foreign PMSCs have been hired to secure diplomatic missions, manage surveillance and train elite forces. Though less visible, their influence is growing-and often shielded from public scrutiny by national security exemptions.
An emerging concern is how PMSCs are moving into the intelligence space. Many now offer surveillance, cyber tools, threat analysis and even disinformation campaigns. This convergence of private security and intelligence services blurs oversight lines and makes it harder for legislatures and civil society to track how force is used and who controls it. With foreign firms handling both combat and intelligence, states may be ceding strategic decision-making to outside actors, raising long-term risks for sovereignty and transparency.
Perhaps most troubling is how many of these companies are not paid in cash, but with access to natural resources, such as gold in Mali and Sudan, oil in Nigeria, and even land or other logistics contracts elsewhere. This incentivises companies to sustain instability, not resolve it. By protecting extractive industries or suppressing dissent in mineral-rich zones, PMSCs often prioritise the security of investors over the rights of citizens. This creates “militarised extractive economy”, where profits drive politics, not public interest.
Private forces tend to operate in legal grey zones, where contracts are not publicly disclosed and parliamentary oversight is weak or non-existent. This erodes trust in democratic institutions and removes key security decisions from public debate.
When civilians are harmed, or abuses happen, who is held accountable? In most cases: no one. Courts lack jurisdiction, and governments deflect responsibility onto contractors.
What can be done?
African governments and regional bodies could enforce regulatory frameworks for PMSCs, including public contracts and strict operational guidelines. Resource-based compensation could be banned to prevent fuelling of conflict economies. Oversight bodies could be created by involving parliaments, civil society, and regional watchdogs. Finally, push for an AU-led convention on private security, similar to the Montreux Document but tailored to African contexts.
As PMSCs expand across Africa, they are not only reshaping battlefield but the very foundations of democratic control. From Mali to Mozambique, their presence is undermining public institutions, shifting loyalties and tuning security into a privatised commodity.
The challenge now is clear: to defend not just borders, but the principles of accountability, sovereignty, and transparency in the use of force. As African states grapple with rising insecurity, it may be tempting to outsource war but must be weighed against the long-term erosion of state legitimacy. The future of democratic security does not lie in secrecy and subcontracting but in rebuilding trusted, transparent and rights-respecting institutions rooted in public consent.
This is not just a question of policy, but a question of adapting oversight to a rapidly evolving global landscape. Multipolar competition is intensifying and states like Russia, China, Turkey and Guld nations are expanding their influence across Africa through informal security and commercial deals and old models of accountability no longer suffice. Africa’s security frameworks, both national and continental-have to evolve to meet this new era of hybrid threats, privatised force and transnational threats.
Jasleen Gill, an independent researcher specialising in peace, security, and intelligence analysis with a focus on Africa’s role in global geopolitics and strategic affairs.
Since I’m the owner of a security company awaiting final approval to begin working with the African Union, I can honestly say that if your intentions are pure and your actions are 100% transparent there will be no problems. However, greed and the love of power are also problems that will show themselves in the worst ways and times. It’s important to remember that in order for things to get started they have to have support and that involves high ranking officials who see way to get rich as well as gain or re-gain power. Some Western security professionals desire to have the chance to bribe their way to a lucrative contract in Africa, this is exactly how and why doing work within Africa is in the condition it’s in now. Honest security professionals such as myself and others let our work speak for itself but not just our works but how much it will help the continent and the people who live within it. If any of the Western security companies and professionals seek to do any kind of work here we must leave this continent in better condition than we began working here and above all we have we must work with a clear conscious before, during and after the contract is completed.