On September 21, Guineans voted in a referendum on a new Constitution aimed at returning the country to elected government. Establishing new rules will likely pave the way for current junta leader Mamady Doumbouya – who led a military coup four years ago – to use the polls toformally legitimize his stay in office. This was a possibility that had initially been ruled out by an interim ‘charter’ adopted early on by the military government, which explicitly barred members of provisional institutions from running for election at the end of the transition period. With an elected president – possibly as soon as next December – Conakry will be able to present itself as ‘back on track, or even as a ‘renewed democracy’.
Guinea is not an isolated case. In recent years, sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed a striking resurgence of military coups. Once considered relics of the Cold War era, these abrupt seizures of power have reappeared with surprising frequency between 2019 and 2023. A string of nine coups occurred in seven countries, marking the first time since the early 1990s that soldiers have taken power in five consecutive years.
Now, some of the military rulers who grabbed power through golpes are ‘moving on’ and holding elections. Gabon did it last April, when General Brice Oligui Nguema traded his military fatigues for a civilian suit. Guinea, as mentioned, will likely be next. This recent wave of coups, and the possible return of elections, raises a pressing question: Is a coup worth it? What is the legacy of military coups and regimes for Africa’s development and democracy? Can soldiers in power ever be agents of progress in renewing both?
A persistent pattern, repackaged
From independence to the present, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced over sixty years of coups. Between 1963 and 2023, 94 successful military takeovers occurred in 30 of the region’s 49 countries. In the early decades, coups were often the only viable route to leadership change, especially in states dominated by one-party rule and entrenched presidencies. In some countries, such as Chad, Ghana and Nigeria, coups became cyclical, with four or more episodes each.
The 1990s brought a shift. Multiparty elections spread across the continent, and regional organizations like the African Union and ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) began actively opposing unconstitutional changes of government. The number of coups dropped dramatically: only twelve occurred between 2000 and 2020, a reduction of more than two-thirds compared to previous decades.
But the trend reversed at the end of the 2010s. The 2019-2023 coups shared notable features: most occurred in francophone countries along a west-to-east belt – from Guinea to Sudan (the one non-francophone exception) – often justified by the need to restore security or remove overstaying leaders. In Chad, the military intervened to ensure continuity after the death of President Idriss Déby. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, soldiers cited the failure of civilian governments to contain jihadist insurgencies. In Sudan, Guinea and Gabon, the alleged rationale was to end autocratic rule.
Despite their differences, these coups were generally non-violent and met with significant public support. But why were they happening?
Why the resurgence of coups
The recent return of military rule in Africa has been driven by a mix of international and domestic dynamics.
Globally, the post-Cold War consensus against coups has weakened. Western powers, once committed to sanctioning unconstitutional power grabs, have become more cautious and selective. Meanwhile, non-Western actors – China, Russia, Turkey and Gulf states – have expanded their influence, often prioritizing strategic interests over democratic norms. Their support, whether economic, military or diplomatic, is rarely conditional on governance standards.
Regionally, the effectiveness of African institutions has declined. The African Union failed to sanction coups in Burkina Faso (2014) and Chad (2021). ECOWAS, once a staunch defender of constitutional order, struggled to respond to the 2023 coup in Niger, facing internal divisions and resistance from neighbouring juntas.
Domestically, the picture is equally complex. In the 1960s and 1970s, military regimes quickly lost credibility due to repression, corruption and economic mismanagement. The democratic openings of the 1990s were driven by popular demands for accountable rulers and better living conditions. But by the 2010s, disappointment with democracy began to grow. In many countries, elections failed to deliver tangible improvements. Economic growth slowed, poverty reduction stalled, and insecurity worsened. Climate-related stress and forced displacement added pressure. In this context, the appeal of ‘strongman’ rule resurfaced – not as nostalgia, but as a pragmatic response to unmet expectations.
The economic cost of coups
On taking office, military leaders typically promise to restore order and revive the economy.Mamady Doumbouya’s much-noted speech at the UN in defense of coups is a prominent example. But do they deliver?
The evidence suggests otherwise. GDP growth in a sub-Saharan African country that suffers a coup typically drops sharply – from an average of 3.9% in coup-free years to just 0.9% in a coup year. GDP per capita falls even more dramatically, from +1.3% to −1.5%. These figures reflect the immediate disruption and uncertainty that coups generate.
The negative impact is especially pronounced in the post-1990 period, when most African countries had adopted multiparty systems. In these contexts, coups tend to dismantle electoral mechanisms that, even if imperfect, provide some accountability and policy responsiveness.
Moreover, the regimes soldiers establish after coups perform worse economically than democracies and even electoral autocracies, i.e. regimes that hold controlled, non-competitive elections. While unelected civilian governments also show weak results, military regimes consistently rank lowest in terms of growth. The absence of electoral pressure appears to reduce incentives for effective governance and long-term planning.
Democracy interrupted
What about the political promises? Do military rulers eventually restore democracy? In most cases, yes – but not necessarily in a meaningful way. Of the 33 coups since 1990, 23 were followed by multiparty elections. The average time between coup and vote was about 2.4 years, though some transitions took nearly a decade.
However, returning to the ballot box does not guarantee democratic progress. In 17 of the 33 cases, the level of democracy three years after the coup was lower than before. On average, democracy scores declined slightly, and in many cases, the setback persisted.
Some military leaders used elections to legitimize their rule, winning contests that lacked genuine competition. Others handed over power but left behind weakened institutions and constrained political space. The promise of ‘restoring true democracy’ often proved hollow.
No shortcut to development
Africa remains the world’s poorest region. By 2030, it will host 90% of the global population living in extreme poverty. For most countries in the region, growth and socio-economic advances over the last decade have been limited and certainly disappointing. In this context, the temptation to embrace authoritarian solutions is understandable – but misguided.
Military coups are not a shortcut to development. They disrupt governance, undermine economic performance and erode democratic institutions. Even when elections return, the damage often lingers.
The path to progress lies not in bypassing democracy, but in strengthening it. That means building institutions that are both accountable and effective. Institutions that can help foster real policy improvements, growth and development. The oft-heard promise of ‘better days to come’through military rule remains just that – a promise. The evidence suggests that Africa’s future will be brighter not with more coups, but with more democracy.
Giovanni Carbone is full professor of political science at the Università degli Studi di Milano and Head of the Africa Program of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI).
Alessandro Pellegata (@alepelle81) is associate professor of political science at the Department of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Milan. His main research interests are electoral competition and political alternation, political and democratic support, and corruption
