Regional surveys consistently point to corruption as a leading concern for African citizens and yet the problem has proven frustratingly difficult to address. Some commentators refer to anti-corruption efforts as a ‘failure’ and, with many African countries clustered at the bottom of the best-known global indices of corruption, it is widely believed that the region suffers more from the problem than most.
Responding to this challenge, the number of formally organised civil society organisations (CSOs) working on the issue in Africa has grown rapidly over the last 30 years. These organisations vary hugely in terms of their goals, size and ways of working. Transparency International (TI), which counts 24 national chapters in Africa, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) Coalition (101 regional members), are among the most prominent regional networks.
International development organisations are an important part of this picture as funders of many of these CSOs. Fundings brings with it substantial influence over organisations as well as the scope to shape the wider anti-corruption agenda in the region. How effectively are donors using this influence and with what results?
Lessons from evaluations
Donor evaluations are one source of information on these questions which often goes overlooked. By carefully trawling organisational databases I put together a group of 25 published evaluations of relevance. This group covers programmes funded by various donors (FCDO, UNDP, USAID, and others) between 2010 and 2023 and a range of anti-corruption activities, from community monitoring schemes to advocacy on national policy.
First, some caveats. Many evaluations in this space have quality issues (for full discussion see this report) often because they are conducted within tight operational and political constraints. The majority also focus on questions related to operational management rather than substantively analysing the external impact of programmes. Covering such a wide range of activities in different countries, this set of evaluations is clearly never going to provide a single answer on how to do this work well.
Caveats made it is nonetheless striking how evaluations often report similar challenges. One key issue concerns ownership. Five of the evaluations explicitly flag concerns that the CSO(s) were not adequately consulted on programme design (i.e. the donor in effect designed the programme and handed it over), with this subsequently linked to disengagement by the CSO. Relatedly, eight of the evaluations highlight a lack of attention to sustainability – there were real concerns the activities would not continue without ongoing donor support.
In implementing these programmes CSOs have sometimes faced their own governance and organisational challenges. This is integral to the story told in seven evaluations, which flag that plans were not fulfilled due to the departure of key staff, management disputes or weak operational systems. Common gaps highlighted for programmes were also disconnection from other anti-corruption measures led by government as well as society at large – donor support tends to be channelled to organisations based in the national capital with many CSOs supported having limited regional footprints.
Notwithstanding these challenges the evaluations demonstrate that talk of the ‘failure’ of anti-corruption is misplaced. The evaluations show CSOs registering successes, from creating and maintaining grievance mechanisms for reporting corruption, to securing policy changes to anti-corruption legal frameworks, to advocacy increasing government openness. Part of the problem is how we define success: if the ambition is set as ‘reduced corruption’, this is not a particularly tangible working objective – more refined goals help CSOs understand whether their efforts are contributing to the wider ambition of bringing corruption under greater control.
What can be done better?
Any form of success in anti-corruption is inherently difficult to achieve and fraught with uncertainties. These evaluations do however suggest some lessons from past work which should be heeded. Four cross-cutting points are particularly worth bringing out.
Broadening capacity building.This is a common focus of programmes but capacity building is often construed in a narrow sense of improving CSO managerial and financial capacity. This is necessary of course but not sufficient. As one evaluation puts it, what is equally important is support to “build ‘ways of working’ i.e. facilitation of processes, thinking and acting politically, partnering in strategic ways, forming alliances, etc.”. Donors need to think more broadly about the types of capacity building which will really help CSOs make meaningful contributions to anti-corruption efforts.
Moving beyond awareness raising: CSOs raising awareness of corruption is nearly always cited as evidence of success in evaluations. We know however that increased awareness of the problem does not always lead to the results we expect – it can drive disillusionment rather than action. CSO and funders need to interrogate some of the assumptions they hold around awareness raising and consider how these campaigns can be better targeted to drive positive action against corruption.
Recognising trade-offs to achieve co-ownership: local CSO ownership of anti-corruption programmes is naturally held as the ideal but the reality of donor-partner relationships is more complex. Donors have their own reporting and operational obligations which prevent them ceding full control. Better recognition of the respective constraints on both parties should be a starting point for developing programmes which all can buy into.
Improving monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL): CSOs and donors alike are under pressure to understand results but, as noted, evaluations often have major flaws. Many programmes don’t collect monitoring information and are not informed by clear Theories of Change. While some of the jargon and technical aspects of MEL can be off-putting, fundamentally MEL is about understanding whether what we are doing is serving any good – it’s worthy of investment.
There are lots of reasons why changing ways of working is difficult. Donors and CSOs alike can become trapped in the treadmill of the programming cycle – unable to pause and think about whether to do things differently. Sometimes groups driven by the moral imperative of addressing corruption are less willing to engage in critical self-reflection. This work though is too important to neglect lessons from the past. We must never stop learning if we want donor partnerships with civil society to really contribute to tackling corruption.




In order to disentangle this complex issue, it is important to examine what the two concepts of democracy and development mean, and how the various meanings of these two constructs have influenced political practice and policies specific to African development aid assistance.
By the 1980s, economic failure of regimes which sacrificed democracy in the name of a particular vision of development, abounded.
Although we had exceptions of authoritarian rulers that acted in a developmental way [Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore], for every Lee we had Mobutu, Mugabe, Kabila, Kagame and a colourful despotic tyrant such as Idi Amin. This depressive state of affairs led to a renewed interest in democratic reform worldwide and in particular among Western donor countries. Where in earlier times democracy was assumed to be an outcome of economic development and modernization, the belief now arose that democracy is a prerequisite for development.
From the 1990s democracy promotion was placed prime on the international development agenda.
Early attempts to promote democracy in the developing world suffered from inadequate and superficial conceptualizations of democracy evinced in various forms of democracy promotion by Western countries which led to a re- introduction of competitive multi-party elections, primarily through various kinds of election support and election monitoring/observation financially enabled by Western Democracies.
In Africa, following the granting of state independence, ‘institutional templates’ were transferred to these new African States.
African governments unwilling to introduce positive prescriptive administrative institutional reforms resulted in the imposition of political conditionality as a method used forcing the government to comply resulting by the mid 1990s with almost every African nation regime having conducted at least one multi-party election.
Unfortunately, the majority of African Elections being potemkin in form, process and procedure.
Certainly donors support to civil society in Africa is very important and has helped most key initiatives and programs implemented. I think the real challenge is the capacity of donors to deliver and also manage programs.
The donors need some basic training on how to manage successful anti corruption programs. Unfortunately this is an issue we are not focusing on right now but it deserves attention.
It will be interesting to look at the capabilities and experiences of these managers of Donors program.
The general assumption is that they have the right knowledge and expertise but that is not case generally and it has affected progress in the anti corruption program implementation.