A Call to Zambians: “Injustice Anywhere is a Threat to Justice Everywhere”

This August, Zambia will head to the polls in its next general election, a moment that will determine not only who governs but the future trajectory of the country’s democracy. As one of Africa’s longest-standing multi-party systems, Zambia has often been held up as an example of peaceful electoral competition and democratic transfer of power. Yet this election comes at a time of growing concern about whether those democratic foundations remain intact.

At its core, this is not simply about choosing leaders; it is about whether Zambians still possess the meaningful power to do so. Since the return to multi-party democracy in 1991, we have taken pride in our ability to elect governments and remove them when they fall short. Yet over the last five years, it has become increasingly questionable whether that power remains fully exercisable. The institutions we have traditionally relied upon to safeguard our democratic rights have come under sustained pressure.

This has taken the form of undemocratic legal and constitutional reforms, as well as political appointments based on allegiance and tribal affinity, which have severely limited the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association. What follows are some of the most telling examples – and a reminder that democracy cannot survive if its foundations are steadily eroded.

Legal Reform

The legal framework that governs political participation and public expression has increasingly been reshaped in ways that constrain, rather than protect, democratic freedoms. The following examples illustrate how legislative changes have affected the exercise of fundamental rights.

Cyber laws

The previous Patriotic Front Government enacted the Cyber Security and Cybercrimes Act of 2021. This Act was introduced to instill fear in Zambians with regard to the exercise of their right to freedom of expression in the digital space. The Act achieved its intended purpose; however, unfortunately for the Patriotic Front, it was enacted too late in the day to have had any real effect in stifling the wave of public dissent and disquiet over their increasing authoritarian tendencies.

The then leading opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) benefitted from this in an election that was largely won online in the face of restrictions on public gatherings under the Public Order Act—a colonial relic used by successive governments since Zambia gained independence in 1964.

When the UPND Government entered office in 2021, President Hakainde Hichilema promised that the Cyber Security and Cybercrime Act would be repealed and replaced with a more progressive law. The Act was repealed and replaced with two new laws, the Cyber Security Act No. 3 of 2025 and the Cybercrimes Act No. 4 of 2025, right in time for the elections. Whilst there are some legitimate reasons for enacting such laws, they have typically been used against political opponents, particularly after the criminal defamation laws were repealed in December 2022.

Despite the fact that the Zambian Government rightly repealed the laws on criminal defamation in December 2022, we are still seeing critics of Government officials being arrested and tried for “defaming” the President. In 2024, opposition politician Raphael Nakacinda was controversially convicted and sentenced for defamation of the President even though the law was repealed a year before he was convicted, on the premise that the alleged offence took place before the defamation laws were repealed.

We have also seen others arrested under the guise of other laws such as “using insulting language” under the Penal Code or “hate speech” under the cybercrime laws. Particular examples of this are the arrest and trial of opposition leader Sean Tembo for “using insulting language” in 2023 and Jackson Chamba’s conviction for hate speech in March 2024.

Electoral Process Amendment Bill of 2026

The criticisms of the Electoral Process (Amendment) Bill, 2026 converge on three principal areas of concern. Firstly, critics take issue with the centralisation of authority within political party structures, particularly the exclusive power granted to the secretary-general over candidate nominations. Secondly, objections have been raised regarding the removal of established safeguards in the voting process—namely the official mark on ballot papers and the fixed statutory campaign period. Thirdly, the newly introduced design of the proportional representation system has drawn scrutiny, with critics arguing that it falls short on internal party democracy, fails to guarantee regional representation across the country, and lacks sufficient transparency in how candidates are selected and seats allocated. Underpinning all of these substantive concerns is a broader disquiet about the process itself—specifically, that reforms of such significance are being rushed through too close to the August 2026 general elections, without the depth of public and stakeholder consultation that the changes warrant.

Constitutional Reform

The Constitutional Amendment Act No. 13 of 2025 made sweeping changes to Zambia’s electoral system. I have no hesitation in saying that Act No. 13 of 2025 is even more frightening than its predecessor, the Constitution Amendment Bill No. 10 of 2019. Like its predecessor, it threatens to take our country down the dark path of constitutionally entrenched dictatorship—one that robs Zambians of their rights and freedoms by increasing the already extensive powers of the Executive and the ruling party in Parliament.

What makes this especially troubling is the process itself. Previous governments, for all their faults, at least maintained some semblance of national consultation—President Kaunda held a referendum, President Mwanawasa convened a National Constitutional Conference, and President Lungu established a National Dialogue Forum. This government has simply declared the proposed changes to be “non-contentious” and used that as justification for bypassing broad public engagement. That is a dangerous lie.

On the substance of the Act, I have four principal concerns:

Firstly, the proposal to abolish the three-month parliamentary dissolution period is deeply alarming. The previous Article 81 exists precisely to prevent the ruling party from rushing through legislation that favours them on the eve of an election. This provision saved Zambians in 2021 when it prevented Bill 10 from being passed before Parliament was dissolved. Replacing it with a dissolution date of just one day before elections would hand unchecked legislative power to whichever party holds a parliamentary majority during the campaign period—and given that the current ruling party commands close to a two-thirds majority, the danger of abuse is real and immediate. Also, whilst Ministers, who are also members of Parliament, are required to vacate their office, as Members of Parliament during an election campaign they are likely to have the advantage of incumbency.

Secondly, I am deeply concerned about the structural implications of expanding Parliament. When you combine the increased number of constituency seats—derived from a delimitation exercise that was conducted in secrecy—with the additional proportional representation seats for women, youth, and persons with disabilities, and the ten presidential nominated seats, all of which carry voting rights, the arithmetic becomes very troubling. Today, 16th April 2026, the Electoral Commission of Zambia has announced where the 70 new constituencies will be. Thirty-one constituencies, just under half of the seats, will be in the ruling party’s political strongholds.

The ruling party typically wins the majority of seats in a general election. Adding these further categories on top of that base makes it structurally likely that the ruling party will enjoy a permanent two-thirds majority in Parliament. And I want to be clear: despite the inclusive framing of the proportional representation provisions, passing this system will not, in practice, address the underrepresentation of women, youth, and persons with disabilities in Parliament. The progressive rhetoric is being used to mask what is, in reality, a consolidation of power.

Thirdly, I am concerned about the proposed changes to Article 52, which remove corruption and misconduct as specific grounds on which a court may disqualify a candidate. The broader and vaguer language introduced in its place could be deployed against virtually any candidate on almost any basis—and the targeting appears deliberate.

Fourthly, reducing the qualification requirement for the Secretary to the Cabinet from ten years’ experience at Permanent Secretary level to just five is an erosion of the standards we should expect of the most senior position in our civil service.

My conclusion is this: there is nothing of value in this Act. What successive governments have done—and what this government is now doing—reflects opportunism, not democratic commitment. These amendments to the Constitution increase their chances of winning the next election, not to serve the Zambian people. If this Bill passes, it will not matter what Zambians vote for in 2026. The structural changes it introduces are designed to guarantee a two-thirds parliamentary majority for the ruling party regardless of the outcome at the polls. I urge every Zambian to oppose it. The Constitution belongs to the people—not to politicians.

The Weakening of Institutions

The past five years have brought a steep decline in the role of public accountability. I would argue that this is due to the politicisation of public institutions and the weakening of the separation of powers. The following are examples of this:

The Police

As mentioned earlier, the Public Order Act has been in place since colonial times and has been weaponised by successive governments against citizens, particularly civil society groups and opposition political parties expressing dissent. When the current government came into power, it promised to reform the Act to make it more in line with progressive democratic norms. The Public Gatherings Bill was circulated in 2022 but has yet to be enacted. On 26th March 2025, just over a year ago, the Minister of Home Affairs announced that the Bill would be enacted before the 2026 general election. We are still waiting. In the meantime, looking at broader trends for 2025–2026, in June 2024, Police Inspector General Graphael Musamba announced a ban on outdoor political rallies until security conditions improve. He justified the decision by citing concerns that opposition members could be attacked by supporters of the ruling UPND Party and instead advised political parties to hold indoor meetings. In June 2024, police blocked a Socialist Party rally in Kitwe despite having initially granted approval. Likewise, in late 2023 and throughout 2024, several Patriotic Front (PF) gatherings were also prevented from taking place, prompting the opposition to challenge these actions. In April 2026, it was reported that 3,000 police cadets have been recruited, allegedly bypassing the Zambia Police Service Commission’s official process.

The National Assembly

The most recent and most worrying occurrence with regard to the failure of the rule of law was the Speaker of the National Assembly’s refusal to abide by the judgement of the Constitutional Court in the 2025 case of Munir Zulu & Another v The Attorney-General. In that case, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Constitution Amendment Bill No. 7 of 2025 was unconstitutional because the process leading up to its tabling in the National Assembly lacked the requisite public consultation and participation. In defiance of that judgement, the Speaker ruled that Parliament was sovereign and that its internal rules could override those of any external body, including the judiciary. Unlike parliamentary systems like the United Kingdom, Zambia’s Parliament is not constitutionally sovereign. According to Article 5 of the Constitution, only the will of the people is sovereign; all other public bodies have delegated authority. In many other democracies, this would have led to a constitutional crisis. Unfortunately, not in Zambia.

The Electoral Commission

Zambia goes to the polls in August 2026. In charge of handling the election process is a Commission made up of people appointed by the Republican President. Of the Commissioners, several have known ties to the ruling party; a situation which does not instil confidence that the electoral arbiters will execute their duties without fear or favour. New powers under the proposed Electoral Process Amendment Bill 2026 include the power to disqualify a political party and to distribute the proportional representation seats. Only time will tell whether these fears are founded.

The Judiciary

As the old adage goes, “Justice must be done and be seen to be done.” In other words, where justice is concerned, perception is just as important as reality. The Republican President has recently appointed several judges to the High Court, Court of Appeal, Constitutional Court, and Supreme Court. Without casting any aspersions on the candidates whose positions have yet to be ratified by the National Assembly, it is apparent that a disproportionate number of these candidates hail from the Zambezi regions of Zambia, which happen to be the predominant support base of the ruling party. It is also worth mentioning that in September 2025 a Statutory Instrument was issued pursuant to which judges’ salaries were increased by about 20%. This is despite the fact that the Emoluments Commission, a body created under the Constitution, is the only body lawfully mandated to adjust salaries for the judiciary.

I write this piece on 16th August 2026, the 63rd anniversary of Martin Luther King Jr’s publishing of ‘A Letter from a Birmingham Jail’. In that famous treatise, King proclaimed, “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” It is the slow, creeping injustices that are ignored that ultimately unravel the fundamental pillars of our democracy. We must set aside any affinity—whether familial, tribal, or political—that stands in the way of our inherent rights as citizens. To allow the breakdown of democratic norms and truths is to deny our sovereign right to freedom.