Zambia’s Quiet Campaign Masks a Competitive Election

In Lusaka in early August, an eerie silence lies over much of the city. Five days until the country goes to the polls on 13 August 2026, there is none of the frenzy or excitement that characterised previous campaign periods. With fourteen candidates standing for the presidency, there are few recognisable party names – and for the first time in thirty years there isn’t a single former ruling party represented on the ballot.

Speaking to people in the capital, this election looks little like the ones that have come before it. In prior elections, new billboards went up months before the campaign started, money would flow through empowerment schemes or huge campaign spending and the city would be awash with ruling party colours and activists.

This year, people in the informal sector complain that the kind of resource distribution that usually accompanies the electoral season has been missing this year, with very few posters and chitenge (party fabrics), few rowdy campaign vehicles in the city’s main streets and an eerie kind of quiet – unusual in a country where campaigns have always been a frenzy of activity.

People in Lusaka give different reasons for why this election feels so different, some suggest that the president doesn’t like to spend money, leaning into a common trope about Hakainde Hichilema (popularly known as HH). Others suggest that it is so quiet because the opposition has been frustrated in its campaigning, arguing that the ruling party is sliding into a more authoritarian playbook. But many in Lusaka don’t have strong feelings about this election – seeing it as a foregone conclusion – that Hichilema will win regardless, and that they don’t plan to waste a working day standing in voting queues.

As the campaign has ramped up, it is clear that the sense of quiet and calm on Lusaka’s main streets isn’t the whole story – with parties conducting vigorous local campaigns, and the election heating up.

The battle of the alliances

Defying expectations about opposition fragmentation and a completely one-sided election, the polls have become much more competitive at the eleventh hour. The election has shaped up into a battle between two big alliances –  HH’s UPND alliance, which is now backed by 15 smaller parties – and the Tonse-Pamodzi Alliance, headed by presidential first timer Brian Mundubile and his running mate, Makebi Zulu. The Tonse-Pamodzi alliance includes a broad group of smaller political parties without parliamentary representation, but the core of its mobilisation machine is made up of the remaining structures of the former ruling party – the Patriotic Front.

The opposition came together after three years of constant coalition negotiations, and a shifting mosaic of alliances and allegiances. Brian Mundubile is running on the National Reconciliation Party for Unity and Prosperity (NRPUP) ticket, a completely unheard-of party until presidential nominations in May – after their attempts to register on the 25-year-old Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) platform were thwarted by changes brought in by the new Electoral Process Act (EPA). Coalitions cannot register, so candidates need to stand on political party tickets.

But every former ruling party and almost all known opposition party brands in Zambia were prevented from running by administrative changes brought in by the Registrar of Societies – the body tasked with governing parties – and the new Electoral Process Act, passed in May.  It has been alleged that the Registrar of Societies changed the names of party office bearers, or changed their status from a political party to a church, or in some cases changed party names entirely. The opposition argue that this state interference was the primary reason why they coalesced so late, and on unknown tickets.

Having been the leader of the opposition in Parliament since 2021 and the Government Chief Whip from 2019-2021, Mundubile has a profile amongst those who watch politics in Lusaka. But he was not one of the most outspoken or high-profile PF politicians in the former administration, something which cuts both ways: both undermining his name recognition outside of urban centres and meaning that he has fewer publicly known associations with the worst excesses of the Lungu government. Having relied on remaining PF structures and sympathies in the party’s former heartlands, the NRPUP and Mundubile have run an impressive campaign – with huge rallies across much of the country.

His campaign has done extremely well, despite having few resources and it appears that he is gaining significant ground. While he has a considered manifesto, much of his campaign has tried to leverage remaining sympathies for the late former president, and he has pledged to “rule just like Lungu did.” Many of his promises on the campaign trail seem to pledge a return to the kind of decentralised patronage politics of the Lungu era. The Alliance has repeatedly claimed state interference in its campaign, and selective policing which they say has disadvantaged them. They have also faced several incidents of political violence as the campaign draws to a close, raising concerns about ruling party cadres in UPND heartlands.

For the ruling party, the presidential campaign started late – launched on 28 June, about 6 weeks before polling day. Unlike in previous elections, the ruling party seems to be spending much less in Lusaka, which has resulted in those complaints from people in the informal sector. The UPND has put up a gruelling travel campaign, and the president has been holding mass rallies across the country while also using his position to announce the opening of new development projects. Hichilema has also spent much of that time speaking off-the-cuff and attacking former UPND insiders and MP’s for not supporting his constitutional reforms. He has also used the power of incumbency on the Copperbelt, directing the state power company to connect 16 000 households at lowered cost, and that the Home Affairs Minister should personally take the names of people to include them on the Social Cash Transfer programme.

It’s the economy, silly

When Hakainde Hichilema and the United Party for National Development (UPND) won five years ago, he found the cupboard completely bare – with Zambia having been the first African COVID-era debt default following years of reckless and unsustainable borrowing by the Patriotic Front (PF) government which created what Brautigam calls a ‘tragedy of the commons.’ When they took over in 2021, years of decentralised borrowing, the weakening of the Ministry of Finance and broader de-institutionalisation meant that there was no clarity even on the extent to which the state was indebted: to commercial creditors, multilateral agencies, over 18 Chinese lenders and the ballooning domestic debt which was strangling the local economy.

Having returned the technocrats to the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury, the debt restructuring process was completed in June 2024, which cut over $900 million from the total debt burden and spread future payments over a much longer period. Zambia’s default status was officially lifted in November 2025, when ratings agency S&P Global raised its long- and short-term foreign-currency credit ratings from selective default (SD) to CCC+/C, with a stable outlook. Zambia’s Kwacha was the best performing currency in the world last year, and GDP is forecast to grow by over 5% in 2026. With inflation peaking at 24.6% ahead of the last election in 2021, by June 2026 it is just 6.5% – its lowest rate since February 2018. The restructuring deal – done under the G20 Common Framework – is not without its critics, but just five years after hitting rock bottom, Zambia is once again seen as a key destination for global investment.

We ran a survey in Zambia in 2025, which found that the government’s performance on many of its key policies such as the expansion of Constituency Development Funds, Cash for Work programmes, and the introduction of free education were ranked very highly. However, the primary complaint of many in Zambia is that the cost of living is still too high, and the changes at the macroeconomic level are yet to trickle down to household economics.

According to the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR), which publishes a monthly cost of living bulletin, the cost of a basic needs basket in Zambia has increased by 43% between July 2021 and July 2026, and people’s salaries have not kept up. So, while people seem to be quite happy with many of the government’s flagship policies according to our 2025 survey, the high cost of living will be a key factor when people go to the polls.

Governance and legislation

The UPND government pursued an anti-corruption campaign against members of the former government, with many senior officials facing multiple corruption charges and some being imprisoned for it. However, many point out that while political principals were charged for corruption, none of the companies that took part in these corrupt activities were charged, and few cases have been brought on corruption scandals that have emerged under the UPND administration. In 2024 the Anti-Corruption Commission board was dissolved after a board whistleblower raised serious concerns about cases of corruption, and the whistleblower has now been found guilty of defamation in a judgement that seemingly relies on questionable legal reasoning.

While the UPND administration repealed the law on defamation of the president and finally brought in the Access to Information Act – raising hopes of progressive legal changes – their record since 2021 has been much more mixed. The government repealed the repressive Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act  (2021) and replaced it with two more draconian and chilling Acts.

In 2025, the government introduced the contentious Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, No. 7 (commonly known as ‘Bill 7’), which failed to meaningfully reform Zambia’s long-debated centralised constitution, and instead nearly doubled the number of seats in parliament and brought in 40 proportional representation seats without adequately specifying the mechanisms by which the elections would work. This Bill was passed in collaboration with opposition MP’s, amidst widespread allegations that legislators were paid huge sums to push the changes through.

In the final days before Parliament closed – and just three months ahead of the elections – the government pushed a massive 74 bills through parliament, including crucial bills that would govern how the election was run. This ‘legislative overloading’ reduced the already diminished oversight role of parliament, and pushed through the controversial Public Gatherings Bill, deepening restrictions on rights to protest and assembly. Following an outcry from civil society, Hichilema declined to sign the Bill into law and instead sent it back to parliament.

The Electoral Process (Amendment) Act, pushed through in the May legislative push, cuts voter roll inspection from 90 to just 14 days, introduces party recall powers, and links the 40 new proportional seats to presidential vote totals — changes that critics say weaken transparency, disadvantage smaller parties, and erode already-weak parliamentary independence. The act also requires candidate nomination certificates to bear the signatures of a party’s president and secretary-general, as listed at the Registrar of Societies — a rule that conflicts with both the constitution’s candidate qualifications and the Societies Act which governs political parties. It also allows the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) to change the electoral timeline, a major concern given the questions around the commission’s independence.

The opposition has struggled in the last five years partly because of their own wrangling (allegedly in part sponsored by the ruling party), and because the ruling party has proven increasingly intolerant of dissent. The government has repeatedly refused to grant permits for rallies or protests, meaning that the opposition rallies held in the election campaign were the first that the country had seen in five years – a key break with Zambia’s recent history. Several journalists and opposition leaders have been arrested, with one key opposition leader sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for the defamation of the president – a charge since removed from the statute books.

There are growing reports that any form of dissent or critique results in a call from State House or the ruling party to journalists, government officials, civil society and aspiring politicians. In 2026 Zambia has seen an unprecedented wave of withdrawals of parliamentary candidates ahead of the polls, with reports that candidates were personally called by the president and asked to withdraw allegedly in return for the promise of positions after the polls. This seems to be intended to keep the number of candidates contesting for elections in his heartlands low, possibly to ensure he can attain the two thirds majority in parliament needed to change the constitution.

With just under a thousand parliamentary candidates running in just 226 directly elected seats, the opposition are facing much higher levels of competition for seats in their legacy stronghold provinces – Northern, Eastern, Luapula, and Muchinga. Meanwhile the number of candidates per seat in the UPND’s strongholds of Southern, Western and North-Western is much lower.

Likely outcomes?

In a context where it appears that there was a deliberate attempt by state institutions to keep recognisable parties off the ballot, this election will be a test of the strength of the Tonse-Pamodzi campaign, the remaining strength of PF loyalties and a referendum on the UPND’s policies. As a relative newcomer, Mundubile faces issues of name recognition for both himself and his political party – with the best performance of a newcomer party in Zambia’s history taking 27% of the vote in 2001.

Mundubile is expected to beat that historic best. Our survey results, completed in late 2025 before Mundubile emerged as the candidate, had undeclared voters at 32% while 13% intended for an opposition party. From our results, as much as 55% of our respondents intended to vote for the ruling party. Brian Mundubile and the NRPUP face a significant challenge of trying to sell themselves to Zambians in an extremely short period, without the party labels or name recognition of previous contenders. They are also facing an increasingly dominant and assertive ruling party, which seems to be using administrative process and state institutions to tilt the playing field.

It remains to be seen what Zambians will decide, but it is clear that either way, Zambia will need to have a much stronger opposition in the wake of the 2026 polls. Should Hichilema win as appears likely, the worrying signs of the use of state institutions, inadequately consultative constitutional changes to suit short-term political aims and an increasingly personalised mode of governance and intolerance of dissent may resurface and deepen.

From the first day of his administration, he will be facing down a term-limited presidency and growing demands from within his own party to choose a successor. These risk creating instability within the ruling party that spills over into parliament and possible constitutional changes, requiring a strong opposition to keep in check.

Dr Nicole Beardsworth is a Lecturer in Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa.

This is an expanded version of a piece published by our friends at The Conversation Africa. Go there for the shorter version and lots more great analysis!