Today, 18 November 2024, the European Council decided to fund, at the request of the Mozambican authorities, the Rwandan army for another €20 million. This happens through the European Peace Facility (EPF) and is meant to finance the fight against the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. This support is an extension of earlier support, which had happened in December 2022. At that time, the decision was met with astonishment in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as it was already documented by the UN how the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) were supporting the M23 rebellion in Eastern DRC.
In the meantime, this support has become clearer, with the last report from the UN Group of Experts from June 2024 extensively documenting the RDF operations with M23 in Eastern DRC. When the news of a potential renewal of the €20 million emerged, it was therefore met with anger in Congolese politics and society, primarily directed at the EU.
It’s a question which also rages within the EU: in a press release after the vote, one member state – Belgium – announced it had abstained from the vote within the EU Council. In the press release, the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred in to the presence of the RDF on Congolese territory, and Rwanda’s support to M23.
It’s therefore a question which puzzles many: why has the EU awarded €20 million to the Rwandan army, in the midst of its violations of international law in Eastern DRC? This piece will unpack this question and reflect on the consequences for the regional dynamics and the EU.
The facts: Internal EU discussions
The ‘20 million question’ was part of a major discussion at the EU for much of this year. In June, it was reported by Bloomberg, on the basis of two anonymous sources, how the EU would grant 40 million euro for the Rwandan troops in Mozambique under the EPF– twice the amount of 2022. This did not materialize: in July, it was reported that no agreement was found, and that the discussion – which indeed was raging – was being postponed. The pressure to have the deal and finance the €20 million came from two sides.
First, a number of member states who were in favor of this: France, Portugal and Italy. It has been widely shown how French diplomacy operates in support of TotalEnergies, and this was also the case here: TotalEnergies has invested 20 billion USD in their project for the production and export of natural gas in Mozambique, yet since 2021 onwards (up to today) its operations have come at a standstill due to the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. TotalEnergies therefore explicitly welcomes military support, as does Rwanda: Rwandan troops are still present in Mozambique, and are financing their own operations.
It has been reported, for example, that in June 2024 Kigali was paying $10 million per month for its troops in the country. It has also been shown, however, that Rwandan companies are flourishing in the area. Moreover, since the beginning of the Rwandan deployment in Mozambique, there have been many rumors about support from TotalEnergies to these troops – rumors about the provision of both financial and logistical support.
Second, the European Commission – and particularly the European External Action Service (EEAS) administration in Brussels – wanted to push through the dossier: although EEAS was internally politically divided, there was bureaucratic pressure to spend the €20 million this administrative year, which would otherwise get lost.
All of these EU actors emphasize that the Rwandan forces have done a good job at quelling the insurgency – as also reported in academic and press articles, but contested by others. Moreover, the SADC military mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) formally left Mozambique in July, which was used as an argument in favor of the €20 million financing, in order to avoid any potential gaps.
It has been reported how EU member states such as Sweden, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands were against this financing. The main discussion centered on what was euphemistically named the ‘connection between the two theaters’, meaning that Rwanda is not only military active in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique; but also in Eastern DRC, in support of M23. This raised a range of fundamental concerns, such as Rwandan troop movement between the two theaters, and the potential use of EU money in Eastern DRC.
In the end, an agreement was reached in the relevant body – the Africa Working Party of the European Council – which is responsible for the management of EU external policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. Eight member states – led by Belgium, who resisted a potential agreement the strongest (as reported in the press and confirmed by sources) – accepted a potential deal.
Confidential EU sources state how this only happened on three conditions: first, that funds can only be spent on non-lethal equipment and transport; second, that a potential deal has to respect the Luanda peace process, which involves a retreat of Rwandan troops from Eastern DRC; and, third, that there is no troop movement between the two theatres – DRC & Mozambique.
On 1 November, the EU Council of Ministers decided to agree on the financing. The Council’s press release does not mention the conditions, but it does state that the funding goes to non-lethal equipment (“personal equipment, and cover costs related to the strategic airlift”). The press release of the Belgium Ministry of Foreign Affairs does however make reference to the two other conditionalities, stating that the support cannot be “diverted to other purposes or used for other operational areas”, and that “Failure to comply with international law and respect for human rights may result in the suspension or termination of this support.”
The difficulties: Wishful thinking?
On the one hand, the above conditionalities constitute a de facto hollowing out of the deal. Personal equipment and travel costs are not large costs in this operation, and this condition means that neither military equipment nor salaries can be paid through this financing arrangement.
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that these conditionalities will have a real effect. A withdrawal of Rwanda from Eastern DRC for €20 million seems unlikely. It is also unclear how ‘theatre connection conditionality’ could be monitored or enforced. Importantly, earlier this year, the UN Group of Experts already reported that there indeed is a connection between these two fronts: the report documented 3 high-level commanders who were involved at the helm of both operations – in the DRC and in Mozambique (Major-General NKubito, Brigadier General Pascal Muhizi, and Major-General Alexis Kagame, the current reserve force chief of staff).
Moreover, the current Joint Task Force commander of the Rwanda Security Force mission, Emmy Ruvusha, was mentioned in the June 2023 UN report as commanding RDF operations in Eastern DRC.
What makes everything even more difficult is that there is a consensus among EU actors interviewed that there is no traceability of the EU funds once sent to the Rwanda Ministry of Finance. Overall, implicated actors refer to these conditionalities as a form of ‘packaging’ to make sure the support the support would be accepted.
The question is of course the extent to which this debate over the details of the support matters: The military financing of a government whose army violates international law remains dubious at best. Moreover, as shown above, the Rwandan government currently is financing its own troops in Mozambique, which means that the EU support is not essential for the operations. This also puts additional question marks on the actual use of this support, if this would materialize: the EU EPF support would constitute de facto budget support, which is hard to trace and also remains fungible – i.e. that it frees up more money for the Rwandan army, which then could be potentially used in Eastern DRC.
The reaction in the DRC
In the DRC, the potential deal is met with much anger. To contextualize this, a brief reaction of the recent EU deals must be given.
The first EU financing of €20 million for the RDF in Mozambique (in December 2022) majorly upset the Congolese political class. As I have written elsewhere, several diplomatic sources relayed an incident shortly after this announcement, in which President Tshisekedi, in a meeting with EU diplomats asked them, incredulously, “You don’t understand you are pushing us towards Russia in this way?” This came at a point when Russia was making major efforts to push the Tshisekedi government to its side – the year before, the Russian government had e.g. gifted a large consignment of weapons to the DRC. Much pressure from the West stopped this; and from 2023, the interactions with Russia were severely reduced.
The EU also tried to make up for the first €20 million given to Rwanda. In July 2023, it announced the same amount of support – €20 million – to the Congolese army. However, in the Congolese collective memory, this is hardly remembered: what is remembered is the EU decision to fund Rwanda, the country which was attacking them.
A similar range of events happened later. In February 2024, it emerged that the EU had signed a Memorandum of Understanding on strategic minerals with Rwanda, to promote a sustainable and resilient mineral value chain in the country. This led to much critique, also within the EU administration: it is widely known that Rwanda itself hardly has any minerals in its soil, and that most of these minerals are smuggled from the DRC.
At a press conference shortly after this deal, President Tshisekedi argued how “Everyone knows that Rwanda doesn’t even have a gram of these so-called ‘critical’ minerals in its subsoil,” The deal was therefore criticized as a blood minerals deal, and again led to much anger in the DRC. The fact that the EU signed a similar Memorandum of Understanding on critical raw materials with the DRC 4 months before – in October 2023 – is seen as less relevant here, as this concerns the country’s own resources.
In other words, the EU is using a ‘both sides’ logic in this situation: it seems to consider that when two parties are in disagreement, extending support to both of them is a way to appear neutral. But this logic can of course be questioned in a situation of aggression by a foreign nation; where it instead is seen – particularly in the DRC – as rewarding an aggression.
In other words, even in a hollowed-out version, a new EU-Rwanda €20 million deal will not undo the overall perception in the DRC that the EU is financing an invading country. It directly undermines the legitimacy and credibility of the EU in the region. It feeds the image in the DRC that the West uses double standards with regards to foreign invasions: whereas Russia is clearly being sanctioned for its invasion in Ukraine; action against Rwanda is not only minimal; they are also being rewarded for this. It also feeds the image among Congolese that the West is only there to exploit, and feeds into colonial stereotypes about Western interests in the Congo’s resources.
In a press conference after the EU-Rwanda criticalminerals deal, President Tshisekedi argued that “It’s as if the European Union were waging war on us by proxy.” In doing so, he reflects a widely held view among government and society alike that the EU – and the West in general – is only out there to loot Congo’s wealth, and that Rwanda is being used for this. Other high-ranking officials also emphasized this in my interviews in October this year in Kinshasa. As one security official summarized:
“Minerals are exploited in the East: they’re sold to great multinationals; and they prefer to pass through a third country like Rwanda. The war in the East allows them to do so; and that’s why the EU has signed this critical minerals deal. We denounced it, but it was signed. For us, the Government, this hypocrisy reaches its limit.”
Another official summarized this as: “we no longer believe in the West”; another one argued how: “We won’t take any more concrete countermeasures; but the relations are no longer as they were: we no longer need them; we can live without them”. These interviews also describe the changing geopolitical context, in which other partners, such as Turkey, China or the UAE, play an important role.
This overall context did worsen contacts between the EU and the Tshisekedi government since December 2022 – the moment of the first €20 million to Rwanda. The EU was de facto blocked from having an electoral observation mission during the December 2023 elections; and the new EU ambassador had to wait 9 months before he was accredited by the Congolese government. The recent news of the EU €20 million euro further contributed to these dynamics.
When the newly appointed EU special envoy visited Kinshasa during a 3-day visit in early October 2024, he was not received by President Tshisekedi. According to sources at the Presidency, this was because of ‘agenda issues’, and although there was no official communication on this; it was widely interpreted to be because of the EU’s stance in relation to Rwanda – the critical minerals deal, and the news of the €20 million . Shortly before this visit, Tshisekedi had created a small diplomatic incident at the Francophone summit in Paris, by leaving the conference earlier than expected; as the Congolese crisis was not mentioned in the inaugural speech of Macron.
Why does the EU do This?
First, it is noteworthy how much softer the EU is on Rwanda now in comparison to the 2012 M23 conflict. In 2012, the EU – then the biggest donor to Rwanda – and several of its member states (Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, Belgium) cut donor aid to the country, in reaction to the documented Rwandan support to M23. Whereas the same Rwandan support now also has been well documented, there has been no donor cuts so far.
Second, it’s noteworthy to point out how the Rwandan foreign affairs machinery has been very effective in promoting its narrative(s) abroad to different audiences, including to the EU. The Rwandan diplomacy is generally seen as much more effective than the Congolese. Whereas European diplomats generally express a level of frustration or disappointment in the level of organization of Congolese foreign affairs, this is different with the Rwandans. As an EU diplomat summarized, at a minimum, influential sections of the EU machinery are considered to be ‘particularly receptive to this message’.
Third, there is also intra-EU dynamics.During discussions over the past years with EU diplomats and analysts in the region, two names of Brussels-based EU officials keep coming back – both Belgian, and both having worked at the cabinet of former EU commissioner Louis Michel, who was widely considered pro-Rwanda and close to Kigali. One of those two names, Maud Arnould, has already received quite some attention in the media– in Belgian political magazine Knack, and in a series of articles in Africa Intelligence. She works at the – now outgoing – cabinet of EU High Representative Joseph Borrell, as the expert on Sub-Saharan Africa.
Press articles and my interviews over the last years mention the relative disinterest of Borrell in Africa, giving Arnould quite some freedom and leverage. These articles describe her as being close to Kigali (Knack writes that this has attracted the attention of the Belgian intelligence services), and of pushing an agenda favorable to Kigali. In this context, it has been reported that there is concern among member states about the perceived pro-Rwandan stance of Borrell. Interestingly, all publicly available freedom of information requests to see the communication between Arnould and the Rwandan authorities – here and here – have not yielded any results.
This overall situation has an impact on the ways in which decisions are taken. One article from March specifically mentions Arnould as having urged the second installment of €20 million to Rwanda under the EPF. The refusal of the Belgian candidate for the position of the EU Great Lakes Representative, which was not wanted by Rwanda, was also seen as a result of the above dynamics. Similarly, diplomats interviewed expressed concern about how opposition from member states to the above Rwanda deals has not been taken seriously by the relevant decision making bodies within the relevant EU bodies – such as Directorate General for International Partnerships – for the above reasons.
It won’t break relations … For now …
At the same time, the Congolese government does seem to react pragmatically to the current situation – at least externally. On the 21 October, Congolese prime Minister Judith Suminwa Tuluka met with Jutta Urpilainen, the EU commissioner for International Partnerships – the same commissioner who signed the critical minerals MoU with Rwanda. EU diplomats also describe pragmatic working relationships with their Congolese counterparts.
The question is therefore: why do Congolese actors do not take harsher measures towards the EU?
First of all, paradoxically, the current situation, and EU policies, are also useful for the Congolese regime to some extent: it feeds into its narrative which externalizes blame for the crisis in the East. By putting all blame on Rwanda, and the Western support towards it, the government can deflect from its own weaknesses – such as the shortcomings of the army in addressing the M23 conflict and its relation with the FDLR.
Second, the Tshisekedi government does not want to alienate the ‘West’ – the EU – but also the US. At least, for now, that is. The Congolese political settlement remains fragile. The army is rife with various networks of influence; and the President – having resided for 35 years in Belgium – arrived as a relative outsider. He was and is therefore confronted with a variety of powerful networks, which he needs to collaborate with, and which at the same time are a threat to his rule.
It is not a coincidence that his private security is guaranteed by foreigners, and not by actors from within the Congolese security system. One article argues that his private security is done by an Israeli military firm; a number of my interviews with regime insiders claim these are Romanian mercenaries. The latter group was initially hired to train the Congolese army in their fight against the M23 in the East; and some of the estimated 1000 mercenaries are reported as being used in Kinshasa.
In this overall situation, in which Tshisekedi’s power basis remains relatively fragile, a major fear is what is referred to as the ‘Lumumba scenario’: similar to former President Lumumba, current President Tshisekedi fears he might be ousted from power once he shifts to support from the non-Western powers – after having lost the backing from the West.
Conclusions: An unhelpful “both-sidesism”
This piece analyzed the politics behind the recent EU-Rwanda deals, and how this politics influenced the discussions for a new €20 million deal with Rwanda. In doing so, this piece has highlighted the internal division with the EU about this. The abstinence of a member state in a vote on this – Belgium – is pretty striking: it’s the first time a member state abstains for non-lethal equipment support. At the same time, there also are strong advocates for Kigali within the various EU institutions. Indeed, Rwanda has been particularly active, and successful, in projecting its narrative in various places, including within EU institutions.
While the DRC government has remained relatively pragmatic in its reactions to these past deals, all of this does not mean that the EU is popular in the DRC: the EU – or at least the EU administration in Brussels – is not playing a particularly clever political game in the DRC. This new €20 million deal with Rwanda will only worsen this.
The responses of the EU to this critique has been what could be understood as “both-sideism”, or – in the case of the potential new deal – conditionalities. These reactions haven’t been helpful. While the discussions around conditionalities for a new €20 million agreement might have helped the critical member states to get on board, these won’t change much in the overall political perception in the region. Moreover, as highlighted in this piece, there are concerns about the applicability of these conditions: it can for example be questioned if the connectivity between the two theaters (Eastern DRC and Cabo Delgado) can be monitored and sanctioned.
Kristof Titeca is a Professor at the Institute of Development Policy at the University of Antwerp. This piece is an adjusted version of a Policy Brief of the Egmont Institute, “The Politics behind the EU-Rwanda Deal(s) and its Consequences”.
