Background
It is commonsensical to think that a country will experience peace after its political independence from the colonialists. However, Nigeria’s history is replete with political violence of various forms. The inter-regional intimidations, ethnoreligious polarisations and political violence that sprang in the early years after the country’s independence, which partly led to the first coup and counter-coup in 1966, will never be forgotten. The loss and damages from the civil war of 1967-1970 are yet to be recovered. After the return to democracy in 1999, elections have been marred with violence, albeit by varying degrees. Aside from electoral violence, the insurgency in the north and cessationists’ violence in the south are politically motivated.
Aside from the violence carried out by different armed groups, the Nigerian government is not innocent of inflicting violence on the populace. A case in point is the killing of several young people during the October 2020 EndSARS protests by the military.
In my work, I analysed and explained the experiences of political violence in Nigeria using the Afrobarometer Survey in Nigeria. Violence was captured at three levels: violence by extremists, violence at public protests and violence at political rallies or campaigns. Importantly, I discussed how the experiences vary between northern and southern Nigeria and factors that increase people’s vulnerability to the experience of political violence.
Elements of significant differences between Northern and Southern Nigeria
As a sociologist born and raised in Lagos, South-West Nigeria, I am amazed by Nigeria’s diversity. Every time I travel to the northern part of the country, I reflect on the sharp differences between the two regions and wonder whether the current federal system of government is appropriate to address the dynamics and peculiarities of the different geographical locations. Motivated by these observations, I have demonstrated empirically in several (un)related write-ups that Northern and Southern Nigeria are significantly different in several respects, including migration intentions, acceptance and actual experience of domestic violence, place of child delivery, underweight, overweight and obesity, use of mosquito nets. In many instances, the explanatory factors for these behaviours are different between the two regions.
Related to political violence, the two regions vary in their ethnic and religious compositions- two factors that have historically shaped election results in public offices in Nigeria. Second, the two regions largely vary in their outlooks regarding the idea of progress, the good life, and the reason for being. Third, the two regions vary in land mass (See Figure 1 below) and, consequently, population density, which affects crime perpetration and violence. Fourth, the two regions reacted differently following the public outcry against the officers of the SARS (Special Anti-Robbery Squad) after the EndSARS massacre. While the South advocated for a disbandment of SARS, the North exhibited support for the police unit. Perhaps this was a reflection of the peculiar security challenges each region faces, and the differential perceptions of democracy and the use of force by the security apparatus.
Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing Northern and Northern regions
Regional variations in political violence victimization
My analysis showed that about a quarter of Nigerians have experienced at least one form of political violence, and this ranged from 23% in the North to 28% in the South. The most common form was violence at political rallies or campaigns (18%), followed by violence at public protests (13%) and violence by extremists (11%). The two regions showed some differences across the three forms of political violence. Violence at political rallies was 14% for the North compared to 21% for the South. Violence at public protests was 11% and 16% for the North and South, respectively. However, I express caution in the use of these findings because the data analysed were collected in 2017. There have been changes in the policies and political administrations; hence, I expect that the figures, distributions and regional variations in political violence victimisation would have changed, too. Nevertheless, the figures point to the notable differences between the two regions.
Who is more vulnerable to political violence in Nigeria?
To understand factors associated with the experience of political violence, I first computed a model for the Nigeria dataset, after which I computed another model for each of the two regions.
The Nigeria model showed an inverse relationship between age and experience of political violence, but the likelihood of experiencing political violence increased with the level of poverty. Residents who lived in areas where police officers or vehicles were sighted had lower chances of experiencing political violence.
Importantly, belonging to a political party increased the chances of experiencing political violence. The likelihood was higher for those who belonged to the ruling party than those who identified with opposition parties. In addition, those who joined demonstrations and protests frequently were more likely to be victims of political violence.
At the regional level, the analysis showed that the influence of gender varied between the two regions: In the South, men significantly had a higher likelihood of experiencing political violence than women, but the opposite was the case in the North. Poverty increased the vulnerability to political violence in the North than in the South. Members of the ruling party in the North are more likely to be targeted than in the South. In the North, joining others to request government action on specific issues significantly increased the vulnerability of experiencing political violence, but the association was not significant in the South. However, frequent attendance at demonstrations and protests increased the vulnerability of the South, but not in the North.
Tunde A. Alabi, PhD is a lecturer in sociology at the University of Lagos. He had his Bachelor’s and Master’s from the University of Lagos and proceeded to obtain his PhD from the University of Cape Town. Tunde’s research interests lie at the intersection of population studies and criminality. He has specific interests in north-south differences in Nigeria and has published extensively on the subject.
