Malawi’s upcoming presidential election appears likely to follow the exact script that swept five African governments from power in 2024. The top three drivers, according to analyst, that toppled incumbents from Senegal to Ghana, which includes economic crisis, corruption fatigue, and organized opposition all appear to be present as President Lazarus Chakwera faces voters in what could be the twilight of his presidency.
The continental pattern is unmistakable. Last year, voters punished governments for economic mismanagement, rejected leaders tainted by corruption scandals, and embraced opposition coalitions that promised change. Ghana’s ruling New Patriotic Party suffered one of its heaviest defeats in decades just months ago, with voters citing the same grievances now plaguing Chakwera’s administration: soaring inflation, persistent poverty, and broken promises.
Yet Malawi’s case offers a unique lens through which to examine both the inevitability and the limits of Africa’s anti-incumbent wave. Polls consistently put the DPP ahead: Afrobarometer in August 2024 recorded 43% support versus 29% for the MCP, with 14% undecided, while IPOR’s July 2025 survey reported the DPP again at 43% against the MCP’s 26%. These results suggest the opposition could be on track for a first-round win. Yet the more pressing issue is whether Malawi’s democratic institutions can manage another high-stakes transfer of power just five years after the last contested transition.
Malawi’s upcoming election underscores a striking paradox: voters are confronted with a repeat contest between the same two leaders in their seventies who faced off in 2019, narrowing the space for the kind of political renewal that leadership change often brings. Equally significant, the very institutions that safeguarded democracy in 2019–2020, thus the courts, civil society, and the electoral commission, now face the challenge of proving their independence once again, though under reversed circumstances.
The implications stretch well beyond Malawi. At a time when Africa’s democratic resilience is under its toughest scrutiny in decades, how Malawi navigates a disputed transition will either strengthen or weaken the continent’s recent record of orderly and peaceful transfers of power witnessed in 2024.
An Economy in Crisis
One of the central issues dominating this election which was present in all the elections in Africa in 2024 is Malawi’s dire economic situation. Despite Chakwera’s 2020 campaign promises to create one million jobs and transform Malawi from poverty to prosperity, the country remains among the world’s four poorest nations. Over 70% of the population lives below the poverty line, with the World Bank reporting that the number of impoverished Malawians has increased by more than three million since 2010.
A crippling foreign currency crisis has sparked inflation rates around 30%, making basic commodities unaffordable for most citizens. Fuel shortages have become routine, with motorists queuing for hours or days. The government has attributed these challenges to external shocks like, the Russia-Ukraine war’s disruption of supply chains (especially causing fertilizer prices to increase), and a devastating combination of Cyclone Freddy and severe droughts that destroyed crops and infrastructure.
Yet voters appear unconvinced by these explanations. According to Afrobarometer surveys, economic management and food security have consistently ranked among Malawians’ top three concerns over the past decade. The question now is whether they will hold Chakwera accountable for these persistent problems or give him credit for navigating unprecedented global crises. President Chakwera’s political survival matters beyond Malawi’s borders. In 2024, African incumbents faced a reckoning at the ballot box. Opposition candidates defeated sitting presidents in Senegal, Botswana, Mauritius, Ghana, and Somaliland, while South Africa’s ANC lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 1994. In each case, economic grievances proved decisive.
Voters are increasingly willing to punish leaders who fail to deliver tangible improvements in living standards, regardless of external circumstances. For Chakwera, who rode to power on a wave of hope for change, the irony is palpable, he now represents the establishment he once challenged.
The Choiceless Problem
What makes Malawi’s anti-incumbent moment particularly striking is the poverty of alternatives on offer. While 17 candidates have filed to contest the election, the race has crystallized into a duel between incumbent President Lazarus Chakwera of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and 85-year-old former President Peter Mutharika of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Though former President Joyce Banda remains in contention, most observers expect a two-horse race.
In Botswana, Mauritius, and Senegal, opposition victories brought generational change and fresh leadership. Malawi voters, by contrast, face a choice between a ‘disappointing’ incumbent and a former president they already rejected in the last election. Mutharika’s previous tenure was marked by corruption scandals and the electoral irregularities that the courts ultimately rejected. This constraint on choice may explain why, despite clear anti-Chakwera sentiment, voter enthusiasm remains muted.
The Institutional Stress Test
With polling suggesting an outright win for the opposition or worse case, a runoff, the most critical question facing Malawians is whether the country’s democratic institutions can manage what promises to be a complex and potentially contested electoral process. While opposition support appears strong in surveys, translating polling numbers into actual votes presents its own challenges, particularly given the DPP’s sustained campaign against the biometric electoral system, which may have discouraged some of their supporters from registering.
More fundamentally, the 2019 court ruling did not just annul an election; it fundamentally altered Malawi’s electoral mathematics. By requiring presidential candidates to win 50% plus one vote, rather than a simple plurality, the Constitutional Court increased the likelihood of runoffs and made coalition-building essential for victory. Presidential candidates have historically struggled to cross the 50% threshold in Malawi. Since 1990, only Bakili Muluzi in 1999 and Bingu wa Mutharika in 2009 achieved outright majorities.
The runoff scenario would place extraordinary demands on Malawi’s democratic institutions. The 2019-2020 electoral crisis provides both reason for confidence and cause for concern about their capacity to handle such pressure. On the positive side, Malawi’s institutions demonstrated remarkable resilience when it mattered most. The Constitutional Court’s decision to annul the 2019 election, citing widespread irregularities including the use of correction fluid on tally sheets, marked only the second time in African history that courts had overturned a presidential election. The judiciary’s credibility, enhanced by this courageous ruling, established a crucial precedent for institutional independence. However, the success of Malawi’s institutional response in 2019-2020 depended on factors beyond judicial courage alone. The courts operated within an ecosystem of sustained civil society pressure, particularly from the Human Rights Defenders Coalition that mobilized massive protests, combined with military neutrality and significant international attention. The military’s professionalism proved especially crucial, as their decision to remain neutral during the crisis helped legitimize the judicial process.
The question now is whether this ecosystem will hold when institutional pressure comes from multiple directions simultaneously. If Chakwera contests a first-round defeat or challenges runoff results, will civil society groups maintain their independence and demand acceptance of outcomes? Will the military again choose constitutional loyalty over partisan allegiance when faced with a potentially prolonged political crisis? Notably absent from this equation is the stabilizing influence of trusted international observers. The 2019 crisis exposed a critical trust deficit when most international observer missions declared the original election credible, only to see the Constitutional Court rule decisively that it was fundamentally flawed. This disconnect between international assessments and judicial findings has left many Malawians skeptical of external validation.
The Verdict Ahead
As Malawians prepare to vote, the continental anti-incumbent wave appears poised to repeat itself. The economic fundamentals, polling data, and voter sentiment point to significant headwind for Chakwera. The more profound question is whether Malawi’s democratic institutions like the courts, electoral commission, military, and civil society, can manage this transition with the same professionalism they demonstrated in 2019-2020.
The recycled choice between Chakwera and Mutharika may frustrate voters seeking renewal. Yet if Malawi’s democracy manages another contested transition, it will mark one of the clearest demonstrations of institutional resilience on the continent.
Richard Kweitsu is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of Florida Gainesville.
He must go the countrys economy is bad