As Uganda prepares for the 2026 general elections, the country increasingly resembles an electoral dictatorship. The presidential and parliamentary polls, scheduled for February 2026, will unfold against a backdrop of severe economic, security, political, and social challenges. Adding to the uncertainty are growing concerns over the health of 80-year-old President Yoweri Museveni, who has ruled the country for four decades. His continued grip on power—despite mounting public discontent and speculation about succession—has heightened political tensions ahead of the vote. Many believe Museveni may be contesting the presidency for the last time, a possibility that has triggered fierce infighting within the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), as rival factions position themselves to inherit power should a transition arise. This analysis outlines the key dynamics and flashpoints shaping Uganda’s political landscape in the lead-up to the 2026 general elections.
The political environment is already heating up and is likely to grow even more hostile toward opponents of President Museveni’s long-standing rule, as well as media outlets and civil society organizations perceived to be critical of the regime. In recent months, opposition leaders have faced escalating harassment, including arbitrary arrests and detentions on politically motivated charges. Meanwhile, civil society organizations are under increasing pressure, with tighter regulations and heightened surveillance aimed at curbing their ability to influence the political process. At the same time, the regime continues to exploit the power of incumbency—mobilizing state resources, manipulating public institutions, and restricting access to media and public spaces––to entrench its dominance and suppress dissent ahead of the elections.
To many Ugandans, these are common tactics that President Museveni and the ruling NRM party have repeatedly employed to secure electoral victories. The ongoing campaign of arrests and intimidation against opposition leaders significantly undermines their ability to organize, campaign and connect with voters. Simultaneously, the regime appears intent on shielding the electoral process from scrutiny by restricting civic engagement and imposing stringent regulations on civil society organizations that play essential roles in voter education, election monitoring, and political advocacy. The abuse of state resources and public institutions further enables the NRM to dominate media coverage, expand patronage networks, and deploy security forces to enforce political loyalty, all of which have collectively eroded the possibility of a democratic electoral process.
Having successfully stifled the opposition, the civil society, and the media, President Museveni has now turned his attention to critical voices within the Kampala-based diplomatic community—particularly those who have raised concerns about widespread human rights abuses. A recent visit by the European Union (EU) delegation to the opposition National Unity Platform (NUP) party headquarters to discuss human rights violations in Uganda sparked a sharp backlash from the government, which accused EU member states of meddling in domestic affairs by allegedly funding the opposition and supporting LGBTQ activists in Uganda. The meeting that enraged the regime had been convened to address a growing pattern of arbitrary arrests, unlawful detentions, torture, enforced disappearances, and other forms of ill-treatment targeting government critics and opposition politicians at the hands of the police, military, and intelligence agencies. Following the meeting, President Museveni’s son, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba—the current Chief of Defence Forces (CDF)—sparked controversy with a series of provocative social media posts in which he threatened to expel EU diplomats who had met with opposition leader Bobi Wine. He warned that the EU diplomats were “playing with fire” and declared that he had “marked all those diplomats” captured by the media attending the meeting—further heightening tensions and raising alarms over Uganda’s deteriorating diplomatic posture. The EU ambassadors, led by Ambassador Jan Sadek, strongly condemned Muhoozi’s remarks, particularly a tweet in which he boasted about detaining opposition activists in his “basement”—a term widely recognized in Uganda as a euphemism for torture.
To calm the escalating diplomatic row between Gen. Muhoozi and EU dignitaries, a meeting was convened in the northern city of Gulu by Gen. Salim Saleh, President Museveni’s younger brother. During the meeting, EU diplomats raised concerns about Muhoozi’s controversial political tweets, his threats to expel them from Uganda, and the broader damage his actions were inflicting on the country’s international reputation. Although Gen. Saleh holds no official position in the Museveni administration, he is widely regarded as the de facto vice president, wielding considerable behind-the-scenes influence from his base in Northern Uganda. In an apparent effort to de-escalate the situation, Saleh apologized to the EU diplomats on Muhoozi’s behalf and expressed his own frustration, reportedly saying, “I don’t know what he will tweet tonight.” However, shortly after the meeting, Muhoozi took to Twitter again, denouncing the gathering as “an abomination” and “disrespectful to Uganda.”
A few days after the EU delegation’s meeting in Gulu, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) acting spokesman, Col. Chris Magezi, issued a statement announcing the suspension of Uganda-Germany security cooperation. He accused the German Ambassador to Uganda, Matthias Schauer—who had been the most outspoken diplomat during the Gulu meeting—of engaging in “subversive activities” against the Ugandan government. Magezi claimed, without evidence, that the ambassador was clandestinely supporting rebel activities across the country, in violation of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which governs the conduct of diplomats and the maintenance of cordial relations between states. Germany strongly rejected these allegations, calling them baseless and unfounded.
Gen. Muhoozi also weighed in via a post on X (formerly Twitter), stating that the issue was personal and not reflective of Uganda’s relationship with the German people. However, his remarks quickly drew criticism after he mocked the ambassador’s physical appearance, writing: “Why on earth did they send the SHORTEST German possible to be Ambassador here?” Meanwhile, supporters of Muhoozi—organizing under the Patriotic League of Uganda, a civic organization that evolved from the Muhoozi Kainerugaba (MK) Movement—staged a demonstration at the German Embassy in Kampala to protest Ambassador Schauer’s alleged conduct. The incident further strained Uganda’s diplomatic relations and raised serious questions about the military’s increasing involvement in foreign affairs and the personalization of diplomacy.
The fact that EU diplomats chose to meet with General Salim Saleh to express their concerns about Muhoozi’s conduct underscores the informal power structures that underpin Uganda’s political system. Despite holding no formal government position and never having been elected to public office, Gen. Saleh—President Museveni’s younger brother—exerts immense behind-the-scenes influence within the ruling NRM regime. His central role in mediating sensitive political and diplomatic issues reflects how real power in Uganda often resides outside formal institutions and constitutional frameworks. Observers have long pointed to Gen. Saleh as a key architect of informal governance in Uganda, operating as a shadow vice president with the authority to broker deals, resolve disputes, and dispense political or economic favours. Politicians, diplomats, investors seeking access to state resources or protection frequently turn to Saleh, recognizing his unique ability to unlock regime patronage. Based in the northern city of Gulu, Saleh has effectively established a quasi-administrative centre, often described as a “mini-state,” from which he convenes meetings with aggrieved social groups—including veterans, musicians, youth, and local elites—and acts swiftly to address their concerns. His role illustrates how Uganda’s formal institutions are often bypassed in favour of informal networks of loyalty, kinship, and personal authority, which are central to the functioning and resilience of Museveni’s authoritarian rule.
Over the past three years, Gen. Muhoozi has increasingly projected himself as the natural heir to his father’s presidency, exuding a sense of entitlement to Uganda’s top office. He has publicly declared his ambition to succeed his father as president and is an increasingly powerful figure in Uganda’s political and security landscape. He has consistently signalled his political aspirations through an active social media presence, public statements, and rallies organized under the Muhoozi Kainerugaba (MK) Movement. In 2023, Muhoozi openly expressed interest in contesting the 2026 presidential election, prompting supporters to print campaign posters and organize around various elective positions associated with the movement. They held various mobilization rallies and celebrations across the country—many of which clearly violated the military’s code of conduct for serving officers. Some events were thinly disguised as birthday celebrations, though their political intent was apparent. The MK Movement quickly began attracting both elite and grassroots support, positioning itself as a vehicle for Muhoozi’s potential candidacy. However, its momentum stalled after it became apparent that President Museveni had no intention of retiring ahead of the 2026 elections. Despite the setback, Muhoozi has continued to carryout political mobilization, and openly engaging in partisan discourse. He has positioned himself not merely as a potential contender but as the presumptive successor. This perception has been reinforced by President Museveni’s deliberate promotion of Muhoozi to the highest position in the military, as well as by the tacit backing of elite networks within the ruling establishment who see a power transition from father to son as the most viable path to safeguarding their political influence and economic interests. In a 2024 cabinet reshuffle, some MK loyalists were rewarded with ministerial posts.
As Chief of Defence Forces, Muhoozi currently holds the highest position in Uganda’s military hierarchy, granting him significant control over the armed forces—arguably the most powerful instrument of state authority in the country. His rapid ascent has been enabled not only by President Museveni’s strategic appointments of him to key military positions but also by a loyal coalition within the armed forces, intelligence services, and the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM). In contrast to past military officers who have maintained formal neutrality, Muhoozi has openly engaged in partisan politics, blurring the lines between military service and political ambition—an unprecedented development in Uganda’s post-1986 political order.
Unlike other serving army officers, Gen. Muhoozi has repeatedly shown open defiance towards constitutional institutions and civilian oversight mechanisms, often acting with apparent impunity. He has openly defied parliamentary summons, dismissively vowing never to appear before what he called “clowns,” and went as far as threatening to arrest members of the parliamentary committee that summoned him. When the Leader of the Opposition attempted to raise concerns about Muhoozi’s behaviour during a parliamentary session, the House Speaker, Anita Among, quickly shut down the discussion—further shielding him from scrutiny. After the abduction of Bobi Wine’s bodyguard, Edward Ssebufu (commonly known by his alias Eddie Mutwe), and Muhoozi’s tweet claiming to be personally holding him in his “basement”, the chairperson of the Uganda Human Rights Commission, Mariam Wangadya, issued a release order addressed to Muhoozi in his capacity as the Chief of Defence Forces. Muhoozi responded with defiance and hostility, tweeting: “If these people value the lives we gave them, they MUST NEVER even think of sending me such a STUPID letter again! This is their last warning! I expect an apology.” In a separate incident, Muhoozi also condemned a Supreme Court ruling that barred the trial of civilians in military courts, calling the decision “deeply unfortunate and entirely unacceptable.” The regime, using its majority in parliament hurriedly passed the UPDF Amendment Bill that has since been assented to by president Museveni.
Despite widespread public outcry over Gen. Muhoozi’s conduct, President Museveni has largely remained silent on his son’s political ambitions and has persistently avoided addressing Muhoozi’s repeated partisan statements—despite their clear violation of the UPDF Act, which prohibits serving military officers from engaging in political activity. While Museveni has not explicitly endorsed Muhoozi as his successor, his unwillingness to restrain his son—alongside a long-standing pattern of promoting him to high-ranking military positions—has been widely interpreted as tacit support for his political aspirations. This calculated silence has fuelled speculation that Museveni is deliberately managing a dynastic succession strategy, using ambiguity to maintain leverage over internal rivals and external observers while keeping transition scenarios under his control.
The only instances in which President Museveni has intervened in response to Muhoozi’s behaviour have been when his son’s actions threaten to destabilize Uganda’s foreign relations. A notable example occurred after Muhoozi tweeted that he could invade and capture Nairobi within two weeks—a remark that triggered a diplomatic uproar. Museveni responded by issuing a personal apology to Kenyan President William Ruto, asking “our Kenyan brothers and sisters to forgive us for tweets sent by General Muhoozi…” Although Muhoozi was subsequently removed from his position as Commander of the Land Forces, he was simultaneously promoted to the rank of full General—signalling continued presidential favour rather than rebuke. A similar pattern emerged when Muhoozi threatened to expel the EU and U.S. ambassadors from Uganda. Museveni quietly met with both diplomats to contain the fallout. These episodes suggest that while Museveni tolerates—and arguably encourages—Muhoozi’s domestic political manoeuvring, he remains acutely aware of the risks such conduct poses to Uganda’s international reputation and strategic alliances.
As the 2026 elections draw closer, many Ugandans remain deeply uncertain about the country’s future. As in previous electoral cycles, the military, police, and intelligence agencies are once again becoming entangled in partisan activities—arresting and detaining opposition activists, disrupting campaign events, and enforcing selective restrictions on political gatherings. The regime has systematically stifled civil society and independent media, creating a climate of fear and suppressing critical voices. Security agencies continue to play a central role in obstructing opposition mobilization, effectively narrowing the political space and undermining prospects for democratic participation. With these patterns repeating and tensions escalating, all indicators point toward a highly volatile and potentially violent general election.
Dr. Gerald Bareebe is an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of York and current Chariman of the Board for the Advocates for Equal Justice Initiative (ADVEJI).
Ivan Mugyenzi Ashaba completed his PhD at the Institute of Development Policy, University of Antwerp (Belgium). He is an independent development consultant based in Kampala.
