Kenya’s road to the 2027 general election is already being paved, not only by political declarations and early candidacies, but also by renewed infrastructure launches and deepening tensions around the credibility of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). With the recent swearing in of its chairperson and commissioners, a critical institutional vacuum has been addressed. Yet, public trust in the commission remains fragile. This mistrust is not unfounded. It is rooted in a history of flawed electoral processes and politicized resource allocation.
Elections in Kenya have long been high-stakes affairs, not just for candidates and the voters, but for the control and use of public finances. Campaign financing is notoriously expensive, with the average Senate race costing over KSh. 35 million. These figures likely underestimate the true cost of electoral competition. Moreover, Kenya consistently ranks among the most expensive electoral environments in the world, both in terms of per-voter cost and overall public spending. While some candidates rely on personal savings or private networks, public resources, often accessed through indirect or opaque means, are used to plug financing gaps. This raises serious concerns about the integrity of budgetary processes in election seasons.
A growing body of research across Africa reveals that fiscal policy is routinely shaped by electoral pressures rather than development priorities. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has repeatedly warned about “election-year fiscal slippages” across the continent. While the practice takes different forms in different contexts, the pattern is consistent: as elections approach, the imperative to win often trumps the obligation to govern prudently.
In Kenya, this trend manifests in pre-election spending surges, rushed project launches, and expansionary fiscal policies that prioritize visibility over sustainable economic growth. Post-election periods often usher in fiscal populism, further entrenching short-termism in economic governance. This fusion of electoral ambition with public budgeting distorts macroeconomic stability, contributes to fiscal deficits, debt accumulation, and the erosion the credibility of Kenya’s budget process. Over time, it has created a public finance culture where budgets become ballots, and Kenya’s commitment to constitutional public finance management principles is weakened to serve as campaign instruments.
Understanding this dynamic requires unpacking both the supply side (political aspirants who manipulate budgets for electoral gain) and the demand side (voters conditioned to view development as a transactional favor). Their interaction creates a political marketplace with profound implications for governance, equity and the rule of law.
Budgeting for the ballot
Kenya’s public finance management framework, as anchored in the Constitution and operationalized through the Public Finance Management Act, outlines a transparent, accountable, and participatory process. It even provides for checks and balances to ensure prudent use of public resources, allowing flexibility for unplanned emergencies and election year adjustments. In theory, these safeguards protect against misuse. In practice, however, these are often subverted by political interests, particularly across the electoral cycle.
Election years in Kenya are consistently marked by spikes in public spending; some lawful, some questionable and others outright unlawful. In 2022, just days before the general election, the Controller of Budget disclosed that she had been pressured to authorize KSh. 15.5 billion in questionable expenditures. In her testimony before the Parliamentary Public Petitions Committee, she presented WhatsApp messages from the then-Cabinet Secretary for Treasury, Ukur Yattani, demonstrating the political pressure exerted. When asked why she did not decline, she responded, “It is not a black and white, yes or no situation”, underscoring how political economy dynamics can override legal procedures in moments of high political stakes.
Exactly where this money goes is hard to trace, but it is widely believed that a lot of it ends up funding the “informal” costs of election campaigning. This includes making personal donations to community self-help projects and in some cases simply handing out cash to constituents
Just a few months ago in Bonchari, for instance, MP Charles Onchoke’s aide was caught on camera handing out cash inside Nyangena Catholic Church, sparking suspicion that NG-CDF money was being used for political influence.
Meanwhile at the national level, Deputy President Prof. Kithure Kindiki has been leading a series of high-profile harambees across the country, distributing large sums allegedly between KSh. 2,000 to KSh. 5,000 per attendees, which critics argue amounts to bribery and electioneering under the guise of youth and women empowerment projects.
Beyond such high-profile examples of individual largesse, pre-election periods also witness an uptick in highly visible, rapidly implemented development projects, often with limited long-term impact. In 2017, the Jubilee government accelerated the Last Mile Connectivity Project, expanding electricity access in rural constituencies just months before the election. While framed as inclusive development, the timing and location of these rollouts aligned closely with competitive electoral battlegrounds.
These patterns reflect a deeper systemic issue: public budgeting in Kenya has become progressively intertwined with electoral cycles, with public resources used as campaign tools. The outcome? Planning is distorted, fiscal restraint is weakened, and political patronage is entrenched, all at the expense of equitable and needs-based development. Over time, this normalization of politically timed budgeting has blurred the distinction between development as a public good and development as a political reward. This undermines the foundational principles of Kenya’s PFM architecture, which are designed to safeguard the public interest.
These politically driven fiscal behaviours are not without cost. The surge in pre-election spending, often through expansionary budgets and unplanned projects, contributes directly to ballooning public debt and hence the undermining of the country’s macroeconomic stability. Kenya has repeatedly missed its budget deficits targets, due in part to politically timed expenditures that strain available revenue. Post election, the country is often left with limited fiscal space, delayed payments to contractors, and growing debt service obligations. This undermines future investments in health, education and infrastructure.
Institutionalizing patronage?
The risks posed by electoral budgeting are now being entrenched through legislation. In early July 2025, Kenya’s Parliament passed a constitution amendment bill seeking to enshrine three controversial funds in the Constitution: The Constituency Development Fund (CDF), the National Government Affirmative Action Fund (NGAAF), and a newly proposed Senate Oversight Fund (SOF). Having secured the required two-thirds majority, the bill now proceeds to the Senate for consideration.
While its proponents claim the amendment will stabilize development financing, critics argue it aims to shield politically controlled funds from legal scrutiny. This concern is not speculative. In 2015 and again in 2022, civil society organizations successfully challenged the legality of the CDF in court. The Judiciary found the fund unconstitutional, ruling that it violated the doctrine of separation of powers by allowing MPs to usurp functions reserved for the executive. Rather than reform the fund to align with constitutional norms, the new amendment seeks to ring fence its legal standing, pre-empting future court challenges and insulating it from future reform.
If assented, the amendment would grant the CDF and NGAAF constitutional status. This is deeply problematic. The CDF and NGAAF, both long criticized for weak accountability, have enabled legislators, whose core mandate is to represent, legislate, and oversee, to implement local development projects directly. This dual role creates inherent conflicts of interest and undermines fiscal oversight. The proposed Senate Oversight Fund adds another troubling dimension. While senators are constitutionally mandated to oversee county governments, creating a fund they directly control introduces a structural conflict of interest. If adopted in both houses, the 2025 Amendment Bill codifies a system where legislators also execute, blurring institutional boundaries in ways that are incompatible with principles of good governance and fiscal responsibility.
Breaking the budget-election cycle
The entrenchment of electoral logic in Kenya’s public finance system demands urgent and deliberate reform. Restoring the integrity of budgeting must begin with depoliticizing development funds. Legislators should be removed from direct fund control and refocused on their constitutional roles. Yet, with the 2025 constitutional amendment bill momentum, the prospects for such a separation are increasingly bleak.
Oversight institutions such as the Office of the Auditor General, the Controller of Budget and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission must be strengthened. These bodies require financial autonomy and political insulation. Addressing campaign financing is another urgent frontier. While Kenya has existing laws that govern political spending, enforcement remains weak and selective. Strengthening regulatory capacity and ensuring political accountability for illicit spending can reduce the incentive to divert public resources for electoral advantage.
Finally, civic education must be central to any reform. For too long, development has been presented to citizens as a political favour and used to influence decision. Demystifying public finance and building budget literacy can help shift public expectations, and encourage all Kenyans to understand that development is a constitutional right and reject the patronage politics that only serves to exacerbate inequality.
Kenya’s public finance system remains captive to electoral pressures. As long as budgets are written with ballots in mind, and development funds are used as campaign currency, equitable and accountable governance will remain elusive. For elections to reflect democratic choices, and for public resources to fulfil their true purpose, Kenya must break the link between ballots and budgets.
Darmi Jattani (@DJattani) is an economist with a Master of Economics at Kenyatta University.
Oscar Ochieng (@JOchieng85) is a communication specialist and holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Communication and Sociology from the University of Nairobi.




Well reasoned sound evidence based analysis reflecting gross inferior civic civil social electoral deficiencies within Kenya’s Election Administrative System/EMB to the detriment of Citizen participation.
Crucial is focus on governance for development not on grand schemes and universal templates, but on experiments with hybrid forms of governance at local level implementation.
Extensive development experience [30 +years] directs me to this singular consideration—local people can make a difference.
Clear salient is freedom in open choice constitutes a necessary pre-condition for action of peoples to promote their interests.
Focus on civic institutions is crucial however should not be based on universal or Western templates, but hybrid forms, adapted to local conditions and cultures.
Obstacles intense exist for development in unclear overlapping ambiguous institutional mandates, incoherent policies and wrong or even perverse incentives—problems which can be addressed through local flexible programs involving peoples at the grass roots level encouraging an open democratic form of development trenching supported sustained by these local peoples.
Political electoral freedom is not—you do whatever you wish—Inherent in political electoral freedom is that your freedom is limited by the need to maintain and enhance other people’s freedom.
Inherent in freedom is social civic civil responsibility activated by citizens.
The normative choice for freedom is inherently social as freedom implies we make political and policy choices and formulate laws that may limit our own freedom in order to protect or enhance the freedom of other individuals in our society.
Freedom implies that our political institutions facilitate collective action and create the right incentives to further social goals.
Attempts to violate human freedom in the name of some higher goal, whether socialism, nationalism or developmentalism, have usually migrated into policies of discrimination, ethnic cleansing and violation of individual rights.