In recent weeks, the war in Eastern DRC starkly escalated, with M23 and Rwanda taking over an increasing amount of territory. Much attention has been given to the risk of a region-wide conflict, implicating not only Rwanda, but a range of other neighbouring countries, such as Uganda and Burundi.
However, less attention has been given to the tensions and pressures building up inside Congo — a country roughly two thirds the size of Western Europe. These internal tensions feed into the regional tensions and need to be taken as serious: they have created a situation in which Congolese are increasingly stuck between an ineffective administration, a predatory neighbour, and opportunistic politicians who are poised to benefit from the chaos. In the face of the mounting external pressure, internal tensions are starting to rise – raising questions on the future of President Tshisekedi and his government.
Tshisekedi losing control in the East
President Tshisekedi has largely lost control of the situation: his military strategy in Eastern DRC has largely collapsed. With the withdrawal of Burundian troops—Congo’s most important military ally—Tshisekedi’s military strategy has failed.
Less than a month after the fall of Bukavu, a series of rapidly unfolding events has further exposed the fragility of his regime: through an op-ed in the South African newspaper the Sunday Times, former president Joseph Kabila broke his five-year silence, not to condemn the Rwandan backed M23/AFC rebels, but to criticize Tshisekedi’s governance as the main cause of this rebellion. His omission of Rwanda or absence of condemnation of the M23 were no accident. For some, it’s an indication that he’s in talks with M23, for others, it’s an indication that is simply positioning himself amid the chaos – waiting to see what’s happening. This set off alarm bells in Kinshasa and prompted the military court to summon key figures from his PPRD party who had also been very vocal against the regime.
At the same time, it recently became public that the Tshisekedi government has offered the United States access to the country’s vast critical minerals in exchange for security assistance from the US. A letter from his lobbyists offered the U.S. access to critical minerals – including cobalt and lithium – and access to a billion-dollar deep-water port in return for security assistance. It has been reported how a similar deal was offered to the United Arab Emirates – in which a $250 million cash advance was asked – and most likely also to Russia.
If this sounds desperate, that’s because it is. Our various conversations have shown the chaotic way in which the American offer takes place, in which a variety of Congolese officials, foreign lobbyists and others are peddling the proposal in a range of shapes; which one article described as “sowing additional chaos in an already confusing situation”, thereby undermining the credibility of the proposal.
On one hand, Washington has a vested interest in countering China’s dominance over critical mineral supply chains – China already controls the majority of lucrative DRC mines through aggressive acquisitions. However, removing Chinese influence is not as simple as signing a new deal; many of these mines are legally owned by Chinese companies, and any attempt to seize them could provoke legal long legal battles.
More importantly, this move does not reflect long-term strategic planning for the DRC – instead, it suggests a short-term gamble to save Tshisekedi’s regime rather than the country’s future. By tying the country’s mineral wealth to his immediate political survival, Tshisekedi is inviting the DRC into a broader geopolitical struggle for which it is not prepared.
Recent developments have significantly shifted the dynamics. First was the unexpected announcement of direct talks between the DRC government and the M23. This was followed by a surprise meeting between Tshisekedi and Kagame in Qatar – their first face-to-face since July 2022. This broke a diplomatic deadlock that had paralyzed diplomatic efforts. Regional initiatives – the EAC and the SADC – had lost credibility with either side: Kagame was believed to hold sway over the EAC, this is evident in the EAC’s silence on Rwanda’s role in the conflict. Meanwhile, the SADC was seen by Rwanda as biased toward Tshisekedi, especially since its troops – the SAMIDRC – were fighting alongside the FARDC and MONUSCO. Against this backdrop, the Doha meeting paved the way for negotiation, this time under a joint EAC-SADC framework.
With all of these elements, the central issue is no longer just the war in the east – but whether Tshisekedi’s regime/administration will survive: can it withstand the growing internal pressures threatening to bring it down?
Negotiations
Not long ago, negotiations with the M23 were a red line for Tshisekedi and his party, the UDPS. His refusal to negotiate was absolute: when some of his key allies, including the president of the National Assembly Vital Kamerhe alluded to negotiations with the M23, he was promptly attacked by the UDPS. In fact, anyone advocating for negotiations was branded a traitor. Religious leaders, particularly from the Catholic and Protestant churches, took it upon themselves to consult with all key actors—including Rwanda, M23, and international diplomats—in search of a solution. Yet, they were attacked by Tshisekedi’s party UDPS.
What explained this sudden shift by Tshisekedi? Most importantly, he seems to have exhausted all his options. He had long hoped that international sanctions against Rwanda would force Kigali to withdraw support for M23: this was a central factor in ending the conflict in 2013. And indeed, over the last weeks and months, international pressure on Rwanda has increased. Most recently, the EU announced on the 17th of March sanctions against 9 individuals and one refinery. Yet, all of this is still largely insufficient to have any impact. Moreover, the longer the AFC/M23 maintains control, the less dependent they may become on Rwanda’s support.
Tshekedi therefore seemed to have little choice but to pursue this option. Telling in this regard is that it was not the Tshisekedi regime which announced the negotiations, but the Angolan government – only a few hours after Tshisekedi had met with Joao Lorenco; with Tshisekedi’s spokesperson merely announcing ‘taking notice’ of the announcement. In the end, it became clear that Tshisekedi would not participate in the negotiations. The death knell for the negotiations was however M23’s refusal to participate in them – with the recently announced EU sanctions as their excuse.
Internal political tensions
Tshisekedi faces a growing opposition front at home. In an attempt to counter the growing internal opposition, Tshisekedi announced that he will form a government of national unity, with consultations which began on March 24th. However, key opposition figures – including Moise Katumbi, Delly Sessanga, Martin Fayulu and Matata Ponyo – have rejected the initiative. Instead, they have expressed support for a separate dialogue process led by religious leaders. Many believe that joining any such consultations would mean saving Tshisekedi’s regime but also bearing responsibility for his poor governance record. It all shows how within national politics, Tshisekedi’s person has become toxic: he lacks the credibility and legitimacy to be associated with.
In Katanga, Kabila and Moïse Katumbi’s stronghold, opposition to Tshisekedi is deepening. While they do not explicitly endorse M23, many see the group as a means to an end – a convenient force that could help dislodge the current regime. Both former President Kabila and the main opposition leader Katumbi are from Katanga. There is a growing perception, amplified by several Katangan politicians, that the Tshisekedi regime is intentionally targeting leaders from the Katanga region. This sentiment has gained traction in light of recent imprisonment or exile of several prominent Katanga figures, such as former electoral commission president Daniel Ngoy Mulunda and high-ranking Katangan army generals. These events have reignited longstanding historical grievances between Katangans and people from Kasai, president Tshisekedi’s home province.
Furthermore, Tshisekedi’s decision to sideline Danny Banza in his recent presidential cabinet reshuffle has removed an important ally in Katanga. Banza, who served as Tshisekedi’s itinerant ambassador until recently, was instrumental as his main political broker in the region. His influence was evident in the rise of Sama Lukonde – a member of Banza’s political party – who rose from director of the mining company Gecamines to Prime Minister, and is now president of the Senate. Banza has reportedly been critical of Tshisekedi’s proposed constitutional amendment.
Meanwhile, Tshisekedi’s former ally Jean-Marc Kabund, who once played a crucial role in dismantling the Kabila-Tshisekedi coalition, has turned into one of his harshest critics after spending 30 months in prison.
As a result, there is not only a risk of regional escalation but also of a national crisis, with increasing ethnic tensions. On the Congolese ‘radio trottoir’ (street radio), rumors are circulating about ethnic groups arming themselves to take revenge on those they hold responsible. There have also been threats against Swahili speakers in Kinshasa—who come from the east of the country and are seen as the cause of this situation. These cases are few, but they have been enough for Swahili speakers to feel increasingly uncomfortable in Kinshasa and to fear what might come next.
All of this creates a vicious cycle, further contributing to the legitimization of M23 and Rwanda’s claims about ethnic violence in the DRC.
The Wazalendo question
The last contentious issue are the Wazalendo (Swahili for ‘patriots’) – a group made up of volunteers and even former members of armed groups who have been fighting side by side with the Congolese army against M23. To legitimize them, the government quickly passed a law on reservist, which basically integrated them within the country’s security architecture. However, they are a ticking time bomb. To be sure, the Wazalendo were at the forefront of the conflict and often fought even when the FARDC were not. However, they are hard to control: Not only have they engaged in direct clashes with the FARDC, but they have also been implicated in several acts of violence against civilians.
Negotiations mean that they will have to be demobilized. But, past attempts at demobilization have failed and led to the proliferation of even more armed groups. The Wazalendo are battle-tested and heavily armed. Additionally, since the M23 took Goma and Bukavu, it has been targeting the Wazalendo. As a result, negotiating with the M23 might send the wrong message to the Wazalendo and they may feel betrayed by Kinshasa, further adding to tensions.
The question is what all of this means in the short and medium term. Congolese radio trottoir has been filled with many rumors over the last weeks, of coups brewing, and of key-officials fleeing the country. At the same time, M23’s progress in the East seems to have slowed down. The figure of Tshisekedi however remains contested, and it remains to be seen what this means for any negotiations or the resolution of the conflict.
Kristof Titeca is a Professor at the Institute of Development Policy, University of Antwerp, and an Associate Senior Fellow at the Egmont Institute (Brussels).
What is the Future for the Democratic Republic of Congo and Felix Tshisekedi?
The crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is getting worse.
In January, even before the Rwanda-backed M23 seized Goma and Bukavu, and before the collapse of much of the humanitarian aid delivery system, less than 13 percent of the eleven million people in need in the DRC were receiving assistance.
The downward spiral for civilians is accelerating.
Political social events in DRC Publics are approaching an ‘inflection moment’ in potential civic civil social disequilibrium negative, ensuring DRC Public Society is set back retrograde decades.
Intense kinetic destructive forces in East DRC may sharply breach any prescriptive positive social fabric binding DRC— a nation state in limited sense of the term.
DRC is utterly lacking in robust independent professional ethical institutions necessary in the advancement of effective Governance designed to instill civic civil social cohesion within. In DRC, Institutions promoting Education are profoundly lacking in resources. Institutions promoting Medical Health Care are shattered.
Institutions advancing Law inclusive of Justice have been hollowed out ensuring that rule of law in DRC remains a legal fiction.
The Public Administrative Institution is beholden to the rent seekers, which have been structured by 50 years of benign neglect by the DRC Governing Structure denying any enhancement of normative niceties in promotion of a functioning effective efficient bureaucracy.
My years in DRC has allowed me to observe and bear witness to the inter-niceties existing in DRC political social economic publics which are manifold negative despair.
DRC political public actors exercising Leadership are for the greater part playing a dangerous game notwithstanding the profound acute frustration of the 80 million+ citizens who continue to suffer economic despair.
My time in DRC has allowed me privilege being introduced to significant individuals of power and influence— Leaders in DRC Society–Civil, Political, Administrative, Religious.
Multiple interactions with these DRC Elites has allowed me insight into the DRC civic civil social zeitgeist.
My impressions are despondent.
These National Elites hold their citizens in contempt and regard the International Community with similar contemptuous disdain.
This ‘disdain’ is grounded within the DRC civic civil social matrix whereby visible strength in power is revered, feared and any weakness in the lacking of action in power is despised.
With effective Leadership in Governance DRC could well be on the cusp of emerging economic social greatness as an African National State administered and subject to norms grounded within rules ubiquitous for all Citizens, regardless of rank in status.
A DRC State reflecting strong the rule of law in process and in procedure I believe will create a political public cascading effect in Sub-Saharan Africa inordinate in the calming of ‘ad hoc’ extremism in rent seeking governance patrimonial.
Why is DRC most challenged in elements social civic civil political publics?
My muse why current DRC civic civil public politics is roiled and astringent in utter lack of civic civil social cohesive capacity in performance and strengthening of public institutions can be traced to the moment of Congo Independence from Belgium in June 30, 1960.
I remain convinced that the circumstances surrounding the 1961 assassination/murder/execution of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba witnessed the commencement and root of many of the present day problems afflicting DRC—–an African Nation State so rich rife in human capital potential and promise, yet most unactualized in social civic economic and public political specific ‘gravity’.
Something about Lumumba’s social civic public trajectory and the manner of his death offended global public opinion among both the elites and non elites, and has continued to attract and generate attention within the United Nations, and in Belgium and in the United States, and even in DRC itself. Many political public and social civic actors—–black Africans and white internationals created and instrumentalized Lumumba’s downfall.
A review of Congo’s politics in 1960 both integrates and suggests for me the perspectives of at least four primary competing public civic actors lending to DRC enfeeblement in ‘political social economic publics’ persisting to this day resulting with grave consequences!
1. the Congo’s inexperienced politicians who lacked absolute comprehension as to how to govern and why governance exists
2. a normative righteous presumptive yet most flawed United Nations exemplified by the then Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold who at times displayed an idealized form in absolute lack in prescriptive sound reasoned judgement when confronting crisis
3. an entrenched Belgian bureaucracy determined to hold on to and maintain past imperial prerogatives regardless of collateralized national Congo enmity directed to this soon to be vestigial colonialist ‘dictat’ in a land no longer Belgium sovereign
4. an arrogant and destructive United States which under CIA aegis elected to project ‘cold war’ leitmotiv into Congo social civics without regard to potential social civic strife.
This most arresting complex multi-dimensional tale of greed and power has intersecting narrative lines and an international array of participant actors.
These diverse political public styles and variance in social civic conventions of propriety do require an explanation as well as a profound reflective consideration with the reward being a fuller complete and more profound understanding of a momentous event in African social civic public political topography.
The Congo in 1960 illustrates manifest the roots of empire, and also the exercise and deployment of power without mercy. The social public ruin of Lumumba displays in purest form the vicious character of society without sovereignty, and illustrates the deepest problems of political ethics.
Today, DRC’s institutions of social civic governance are profoundly entailed, corrupted, encumbered along being incompetent in matters Public Administrative.
The antecedents to this break down in social public civics can be traced/originating in 1960 when Lumumba stated in his astringent vibrant passionate address to King Baudouin on June 30, Republic of Congo Independence Day that all was possible for Congo if State Administrative Governance was predicated in service to the people instead of crass post colonial exploitation in service only benefiting the entrenched elites in Congo.