Presidential elections in most African countries are often a source of concern, revealing internal tensions arising from democratic rules that are frequently undermined. The Central African Republic (CAR), with its chaotic democratic history marked by repeated coups d’état, is no exception. After the deadly crisis from late 2012 to 2015, a political transition allowed for the democratic transfer of power through combined elections based on a new constitution adopted on March 30, 2016. However, having been re-elected for a second term amid yet another failed coup attempt by a new rebel coalition, President Faustin Archange Touadéra amended the Constitution to open a door to another seven-year term despite opposition and civil society protests. Time for a closer look at CAR’s evolving political landscape and how the upcoming elections bode for the country’s democracy.
From Rupture to Continuity
After the many crises that CAR has experienced, things seemed to return to normal in 2016 with the election of new legitimate authorities. The signing of a Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation between the 14 main armed groups and the government in February 2019 also raised hopes for an end to violence. However, despite the presence of several actors in the security sector, the situation has only slightly improved. Pockets of insecurity still prevent the free movement of goods and people. This worsens the socio-economic conditions of a largely agricultural population of whom most already live below the poverty line. They can no longer travel far from urban centres to engage in subsistence farming, sell their goods on further markets, and lack access to even basic public services and infrastructure.
Despite government promises, very little has been done to improve the daily lives of Central Africans, who are condemned to live hand-to-mouth under the watch of a small elite perpetuating a longstanding pattern of resource capture, corruption, and patrimonial governance. Rather than finding solutions to people’s pressing problems, elites pursued an amendment to the Constitution of March 30, 2016 leading to the adoption of a new constitution by referendum in July 2023 – a referendum marked by drastic irregularities before, during, and after the polls.
The opposition parties, grouped within the Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Former Constitution (BRDC), accuse the ruling regime of seeking to cling to power by inserting into the new constitution provisions that exclude its opponents. They also denounce the unbalanced membership and insufficiently independent functioning of the two national bodies responsible for organizing and validating elections—the National Election Authority (ANE) and the Constitutional Court. The ANE is criticized by stakeholders for its inability to successfully organize the four concurrent elections (presidential, legislative, regional, and municipal).
Although President Touadéra once proclaimed a clean break with the country’s dark past, the political and socio-economic trajectory of the CAR shows that this is more a case of rupture in continuity. The main “rupture” has been the creation of a Seventh Republic, entrenching power longevity, which most likely will fuel tensions on the eve of the December 28, 2025 elections.
The December 28, 2025 Elections: A Conflictual Precedent with Deep Roots
Despite many political twists, the governance system in the CAR appears fundamentally unchanged. The upcoming elections, while likely to legitimize the current president’s power, signal no meaningful change and may instead expose the country to renewed crises. The exclusion of political opponents from the democratic process and the closing of political dialogue have repeatedly led to politico-military crises in the past. When democratic expression was stifled, violence often became the alternative—as seen with the creation of armed groups such as the People’s Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD) in 2005 and the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) in 2020.
Moreover, the removal of presidential term limits could heighten the risk of violence if not addressed directly. Opposition leaders, united in the BRDC, have refused to participate in elections they deem preordained, while the main challenger, Anicet Georges Dologuélé renounced his French nationality to comply with electoral rules just to see the regime strip him even of his Central African nationality.
Compounding the situation, budget cuts have forced MINUSCA to announce the forthcoming withdrawal of part of its civilian and military personnel, who have often played a vital role in election logistics and oversight. Despite MINUSCA’s not uncontested public standing, a reduction in MINUSCA’s capacity casts doubt on the credibility of the upcoming elections, even if the ANE—already facing funding shortages—manages to organize them nationwide.
It is encouraging that two of the main armed groups that had withdrawn from the 2019 peace agreement have recently signed a new deal with the government. However, delays in disarmament and encampment mean that the weakness of these processes—combined with political instability—could serve as an excuse for the country’s politico-military entrepreneurs to take up arms to seize power. The actors involved, including the international community, would do well to approach this situation with clarity to prevent the CAR from once again descending into violence.
What Room for the International Community in the Face of a Radicalizing Regime?
The regime appears emboldened by the presence of the Wagner Group and Rwandan troops, whose intervention in late 2020 prevented yet another coup attempt. However, this protection comes at the high price of selling out the CAR’s mineral resources and meagre internal revenues. There is growing fear that the regime is becoming increasingly authoritarian — consolidating a form of personalised regime that brings no benefit to the population.
As seen over the past two presidential terms, the government has made little progress. The next seven-year terms risk returning the country to the authoritarian rule of Bokassa, laced with the clan politics of Kolingba or Bozizé, while the population continues to sink deeper into poverty and struggle with the rising cost of living.
Reopening political space and involving the international community — both before and after these elections — remain possible and necessary steps to spare the population from reliving the traumas of the past.
The first author of this article has elected to remain anonymous.
Tim Glawion is a senior researcher at the Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institute in Freiburg and is currently convening a fellow group at the Merian Institute for Advanced Studies in Africa in Accra.
Feel free to leave your comments, we’d love to hear others’ thoughts on the upcoming elections! Will there be a credible opposition campaign? Or rather a boykott? Or even another revolt?