Zambia is no stranger to constitutional change. But President Hakainde Hichilema’s latest proposed amendment – the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025 – is proving particularly controversial. At the heart of the storm is a seemingly minor change: increasing the number of Members of Parliament (MPs) nominated by the President from eight to ten. Yet behind this small numerical shift lies a much larger concern.
In many ways, it is the increase in nominated MPs that reveals the broader flaws in the proposed constitutional amendments. This change adds no real value to the legislative and democratic system, while subtly shifting power toward the presidency at the expense of democratic accountability – much like many other of the so-called reforms.
Two more nominated MPs may sound like a minor issue, but we should not undermine the value of a country’s constitution. In a democracy founded on the principle of representative government, every constitutional modification must be justified by necessity. It must address a clearly defined issue, increase accountability, and serve the public interest.
The proposed Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025 violates this test, which raises the question, “What problem is this amendment attempting to solve?” Upon closer scrutiny, the answer is troubling: none.
Put another way, what motivated this constitutional change is not the public interest but presidential strategy. By increasing the number of unelected MPs, the executive gains additional influence in Parliament – boosting its ability to pass legislation and reward loyalists, all without public oversight. In short, this is not reform, but political calculus disguised as progress.
Deepening an undemocratic tradition
Zambia’s use of presidentially nominated MPs is not new, but it is deeply rooted in colonial practice. Under British rule, nominated seats were a tool for control – used to co-opt loyal elites, marginalize dissent, and create the illusion of inclusion. Post-independence governments retained the system, rebranding it as a mechanism for expertise and representation.
The current constitutional provision under Article 69, which grants the President the power to nominate eight Members of Parliament, is deeply problematic due to its discretionary nature. Though originally intended to enhance inclusivity; particularly of women, youth, and marginalized groups there is no binding legal obligation requiring the President to appoint individuals from these categories.
This deficiency has allowed successive Presidents to use these appointments for political expediency rather than equitable representation.
The consequences of this loophole were made evident in the 2021 case of Chapter One Foundation Limited v. The Attorney General & Another, in which Chapter One Foundation (COF) sued the Zambian government for failing to meet the constitutional requirement under Article 259(1)(b) to ensure that at least 50% of public appointments are women.
The court dismissed the case on the grounds that Article 259(1)(b) is a directive principle of state policy, not a justiciable or legally enforceable obligation. The case thus highlighted how inclusion remains an aspirational goal in Zambia’s constitutional framework, rather than a guaranteed right.
Despite this unresolved concern, the newly proposed draft Constitution of Zambia seeks to increase the number of presidentially nominated MPs from eight to ten, without introducing any mandatory quotas or guidelines to ensure the representation of women, youth, or people living with disabilities. Expanding an already flawed and unaccountable mechanism not only entrenches elite capture but has also undermined public trust in the wider constitutional reform processes.
In other words, rather than correcting the misuse of presidential discretion, the proposed draft risks exacerbating exclusion under the guise of reform.
No demonstrable need
Tellingly, the amendment provides no public evidence of a problem in the National Assembly that needs fixing, or no public evidence that parliamentary performance has been impeded by the current cap of eight nominated MPs. There is no public evidence that links the existing restriction to inefficiency, legislative deadlock, or technical flaws.
Given this lack of evidence, the only “issue” this measure appears to address is a political one: the need to tighten presidential authority by introducing a more loyal voices into Parliament.
Increasing the number of nominated MPs would still be a bad idea even if there were a strong justification for specialized expertise. There are other less expensive and more democratic ways the government could gain diverse viewpoints, such as simply strengthen existing clauses (like Article 259) of the Constitution by making them legally binding, not just advisory.
This proposal is especially concerning given the broader context. The same amendment bill includes a mixed-member proportional representation (MMPR) system, which would reserve 35 seats for women, youth, and persons with disabilities. If the reason the number of appointed MPs is being increased is a concern for diversity, why does the amendment bill include so few reserved seats that it could actually result in a decline in women’s representation?
And if democratic reforms are being introduced to promote inclusivity through elections, why expand undemocratic presidential appointments at the same time? The two measures pull in opposite directions. One deepens democracy, the other dilutes it.
Rewarding loyalty, weakening accountability
Moreover, nominated MPs are not accountable to the electorate. They do not represent a constituency, face no electoral test, and owe their positions entirely to presidential favour. Historically, such appointments have been used to reward political loyalty, co-opt rivals, and consolidate executive control.
Two notable examples are Charles Milupi and Felix Mutati. Milupi, a key architect of the UPND Alliance that brought Hichilema to power, now serves as Minister of Infrastructure. His appointment reflects both his political utility and longstanding business ties to the President, including through Copperbelt Energy Corporation. Mutati, meanwhile, is a former Finance Minister and leader of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), who joined Hichilema shortly before the 2021 elections. Now Minister of Technology, his appointment reinforces a pattern of rewarding allies and embedding elite networks within government.
When Parliament becomes a venue for political payback rather than popular representation, democracy suffers. MPs should answer to citizens, not to State House. Yet by increasing the number of nominated MPs, the President would gain even more influence especially in a closely divided legislature. Two extra votes may not seem like much, but in a tight vote they could be decisive.
This move also sets a dangerous precedent. Once the number is raised to ten, what stops a future administration from increasing it to twelve, or fifteen? Each incremental shift tilts the balance of power further toward the executive, eroding the legislature’s independence and weakening democratic oversight.
Extending parliament, which is already expected to increase from 156 to 211 constituency-based seats, would also incur needless expenses at a time when Zambia is struggling with budgetary restraints and growing public debt. An increase that will need taxpayer-funded salaries, benefits, and allowances. All these extra costs for MPs that lack civic mandate and electoral legitimacy that elected MPs possess.
Ultimately, this is a constitutional change in search of a justification. There is no demonstrated need, no compelling rationale, and no credible plan to improve representation. What is on offer is a political manoeuvre disguised as reform. By increasing unelected presidential appointments, the amendment risks weakening Parliament, sidelining voters, and undermining the very democratic principles it claims to uphold.
Zambia’s Constitution must be a living document – responsive to public needs, rooted in legal necessity, and anchored in democratic ideals. Amending it should not be an exercise in political convenience. Even small changes can have profound consequences. The proposed increase in nominated MPs may appear technical, but it risks reshaping the balance of power in ways that are anything but.
Mzeziti Crecencia Mwanza is a Governance, Elections & Human Rights Specialist.
